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Abstract* 
This report represents the authors’ efforts to provide a useful, albeit partial, 
understanding of the international defense marketplace – which we view as 
changing toward increasing complexity.  In pursuit of that objective, we provide a 
brief overview of international defense markets in the context of both changes in 
military affairs and the various defense industrial bases.   
In analyzing the defense market, we essay multiple analytical frameworks 
(along the lines of Essence of Decision).  Our analytical models are (a) a 
sophisticated view of offsets in a public policy context with market imperfections, (b) 
transaction cost economics with our unit of analysis being the nation-state instead of 
the firm, and (c) two standard corporate strategy models. 
To test the models’ explanatory powers, we consider three ongoing “cases”: 
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the UK Defence Industrial Strategy, and the Northrop 
Grumman-EADS KC-30 proposal.  Interestingly we find all three hypotheses have 
some explanatory power, but none of the three is demonstrably better than the 
others (in this small sample). 
Keywords: Industrial Base, Transaction Cost Economics, Corporate 
Strategy, Offsets, KC-30, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, UK Defence Industrial Strategy 
 
 



























do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - iii - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Acknowledgements 
The authors wish to acknowledge, first and foremost, the patience and 
support of our spouses.  Second, we are grateful to NPS’ Acquisition Research 
Program (ARP) for supporting our efforts in researching and preparing this report.  
Finally, we are likewise indebted to the professionals of ARP – including RADM 


























do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - v - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
About the Authors 
Raymond (Chip) Franck, PhD, Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of 
Business & Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, retired from the Air Force in 
2000 in the grade of Brigadier General after 33 years commissioned service.  He 
served in a number of operational tours as a bomber pilot; staff positions—which 
included the Office of Secretary of Defense and Headquarters, Strategic Air 
Command; and was Professor and Head, Department of Economics and Geography 
at the US Air Force Academy.  His institutional responsibilities at NPS have included 
the interim chairmanship of the newly formed Systems Engineering Department from 
July 2002 to September 2004, teaching a variety of economics courses and serving 
on a number of committees to revise curricula for both the Management and 
Systems Engineering disciplines.  His research agenda focuses on defense 
acquisition practices and military innovation. 
Raymond (Chip) Franck 
Senior Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: (831) 656-3614 
E-mail: refranck@nps.edu  
Ira Lewis, PhD, is Associate Professor of Logistics, Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  His 
interests include transportation, public policy, and defense acquisition, particularly 
from a comparative perspective. 
Ira A. Lewis 
Associate Professor 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: (831) 656-2464 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - vi - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Bernard Udis, PhD, is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of 
Colorado at Boulder and Visiting Research Professor at the US Naval Postgraduate 
School at Monterey.  He has also served as Distinguished Visiting Professor of 
Economics at the US Air Force Academy, and as William C. Foster Fellow at the US 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.  His NATO Research Fellowship examined 
the costs and benefits of offsets in defense trade.   
Professor Udis' published work includes three books:  The Economic 
Consequences of Reduced Military Spending (editor, 1973), From Guns to Butter: 
Technology Organizations and Reduced Military Spending in Western Europe 
(1978), and The Challenge to European Industrial Policy: Impacts of Redirected 
Military Spending (1987).  In addition, he has published numerous articles in 
scholarly journals on defense industries and military power.  These include "Offsets 
as Industrial Policy: Lessons From Aerospace" (with Keith Maskus, 1992), and "New 
Challenges to Arms Export Control:  Whither Wassenaar?" (with Ron Smith, 2001).  
A number of his works are considered classics in defense economics and have been 
reprinted in collections such as The Economics of Defence (Todd Sandler and Keith 
Hartley, 2001) and Arms Trade, Security and Conflict (Paul Levine and Ron Smith, 
2003). 
Professor Udis' current research focuses on competition and cooperation in 
the aerospace industries of the US and the EU.   
Bernard Udis 
Professor Emeritus, University of Colorado at Boulder 
Visiting Research Professor, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
13 Camino Real 
Sandia Park, NM 87047 
Phone: (505)286-2789 















Echoes across the Pond:  
Understanding EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
29 January 2008 
Revised 20 May 2008 
by 
BGen (Ret) Chip Franck, Senior Lecturer, 
Dr. Ira Lewis, Associate Professor, and 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Dr. Bernard Udis, Professor Emeritus 
University of Colorado (Boulder) and Visiting Research Professor 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of 
























do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - ix - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ..............................................................................................1 
II. Major Developments in the International Defense Marketplace...........3 
A. Two Revolutions in Military Affairs...................................................4 
B. Developments in the Global Defense Marketplace........................11 
C. Current US and European Defense Industrial Developments .......19 
III. Analytical Frameworks ..........................................................................29 
A. Analysis with Multiple Models........................................................30 
B. Offsets and International Industrial Participation ...........................31 
C. Transaction Cost Economics.........................................................50 
D. Corporate Strategy Models............................................................55 
IV. Three “Cases”: Joint Strike Fighter, UK Defence Industrial 
Strategy, and KC-30 Proposal...............................................................59 
A. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (Lightning II) ....................................59 
B. Emergence of the UK Defence Industrial Strategy ........................93 
C. The KC-30 Proposal ....................................................................106 
V. By Way of Conclusions .......................................................................115 

























do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 1 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
I. Introduction 
This report represents the collective efforts of the three authors to provide a 
useful, albeit partial, framework for understanding an international defense 
marketplace that we view as quite complex and as becoming more so.  As a start, 
we have chosen to focus on the defense markets and defense industrial bases in the 
United States and the European Union.  This is hardly a complete picture.  A number 
of major defense suppliers are operating outside those groupings to varying 
degrees.  The other players include great powers such as China, India, Japan, and 
Russia.  A complete list would likewise include smaller, but nonetheless very 
competent, defense suppliers from Australia, Brazil, Israel, Norway, South Africa, 
South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan and Turkey.  Nonetheless, the United States and the 
EU are presently the leading centers of defense production—both in technologies 
and sales.  As such, they constitute reasonable subjects with which to start this line 
of inquiry.   
More specifically, our basic aim is to provide: (a) an interpretative narrative of 
major developments within the global defense marketplace, (b) a set of explanatory 
paradigms to make sense of those developments, and (c) an exercise of those 
paradigms within the context of three ongoing “cases” in the international defense 
trade.  Accordingly, Section 2 below discusses the ongoing revolutions in military 
affairs (theirs and ours), major trends within the global defense market, and major 
developments more specifically within the US and EU. 
Section 3 provides our interpretative paradigms.  It starts with the idea of 
using multiple models to understand complex events.1  However, we offer: (a) a 
rather sophisticated and nuanced view of offsets, (b) Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE), and (c) corporate strategy (Five Forces and “Co-opetition”). 
                                            
1 This is associated primarily with Graham Allison’s “essence of decision” approach to analyzing the 
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Section 4 integrates major trends in the defense market position (Section 2) 
with the models presented in Section 3.  In particular, we consider three ongoing 
developments that we believe encompass the major developments and issues in the 
international defense market: the Joint Strike Fighter consortium, the EADS (and 
Northrop-Grumman) KC-30 proposal, and the UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy. 
Finally, Section 5 assesses our models’ explanatory powers and offers some 
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II. Major Developments in the International 
Defense Marketplace 
As indicated above, we believe that the international environment for both 
production and trading of defense goods is steadily becoming more complex.  
Accordingly, our first task is to offer our views of some of the more important 
ongoing developments in the marketplace.  Section A below discusses changes in 
the means of warfare.  In particular, we believe that two revolutions in military affairs 
(RMAs) are currently underway.  One is associated with developments in precision 
and net-enabled warfare led by the United States and its allies.  The other belongs 
to contemporary insurgent and terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda.  In a very 
real sense, the second RMA is intended to counter the first.  Also ongoing are 
countermeasures to the terrorists’ methods by the US and others.  Some of the 
implications for defense industries are also discussed. 
Section B covers other developments, especially globalization and economies 
of scale in military production.  The world’s economy is becoming more global; 
equivalently, national economies are becoming more interdependent.  This makes 
self-sufficiency in any major economic endeavor, including defense production, 
increasingly problematic.  It is likewise increasingly difficult to efficiently produce 
military systems within national borders, while simultaneously relying upon sales to 
the domestic defense establishment.  One result is the ongoing systemic tension 
between the need for defense industrial capabilities (as part of national sovereignty) 
and the economic imperatives of the global defense marketplace. 
More specifically, Section 2.C assesses current US and European defense 
industrial developments.  We believe the major themes in these developments are 
industrial consolidations and defense industrial strategies (generally implicit), 
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A. Two Revolutions in Military Affairs 
Contemporary military affairs illustrate rapid changes in both military 
technology and the art of war.2  That is, new technologies and methods are not 
merely changing wars, but changing the ways wars are fought.  The ongoing 
Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) have both created new military competencies 
for successful innovators and decreased significantly the operational effectiveness of 
previous methods.  The 1991 and 2003 encounters of the Iraqi armed forces with US 
(and allied) forces illustrate the point well.  However, military success is always 
fleeting, and a counter-RMA associated with contemporary terrorists such as Al 
Qaeda is a serious effort to do the same thing to contemporary US (and allied) 
forces. 
A revolution in military affairs is usefully defined in a number of ways.  One 
(attributed to Cohen) is a dramatic change in warfare in which the measures of 
military power change significantly.  Another (from CSIS) is a fundamental advance 
which renders existing methods of warfare obsolete.3  Still another emphasizes the 
role of disruptive innovation, which renders at least one core competency of 
opponents obsolete or irrelevant (Franck & Pierce, 2006).  
RMAs can be characterized by foundations, preferred modes of operation, 
relevant combat organizations, and ideal (or perfect opponents).  The foundations 
are typically found in technologies, which are applied to a well-defined mode of 
warfare.4  Associated also are preferred modes of operation.5  Additionally, the new 
methods are incorporated into an organizational framework.  Finally, full 
                                            
2 Although some observers have perhaps overstated the case (e.g., Owens, 2000), there is, 
nonetheless, good reason to believe that contemporary RMAs are indeed revolutions in the means 
and art of warfare.  The rapid changes in the art of war have also changed defense industries. 
3 The Cohen and CSIS definitions are cited and discussed in Franck and Hildebrandt (1996, p. 240). 
4 Both aspects are important.  The German victory over France and Britain was not a matter of better 
tanks; it was that German tanks were organized in formations intended to achieve operational 
disruption, while France and Britain organized their tanks into formations intended to support the 
“deliberative battle” (an improved version of the trench warfare of World War I). 
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understanding of any RMA entails the opponent against which the new approach 
was intended to work—the “perfect opponent” (Franck & Pierce, 2006). 
1. Our RMA 
The US-led RMA was originally conceived as a way of countering Soviet-style 
mechanized warfare in the latter decades of the Cold War.6  The technical 
foundations involved a cluster of inventions, most notably the microchip, that made 
information processing both rapid and cheap.  The military applications of the new 
technology were found first in communications, sensors, information fusing, and 
precision weapons.  This RMA, developed primarily in the United States, was 
structured to counter a massive mechanized offensive—such as the one the Soviet 
Army (and Warsaw Pact allies) could have mounted against NATO forces in 
Germany. 
The organizational embodiment has been well described as a 
Reconnaissance-Strike Complex (RUK)7.  First combat for a fully realized RUK 
occurred in the Gulf War of 2001 (Franck & Hildebrandt, 1996).  However, 
demonstrations (“precursor wars”) were evident in the interdiction campaigns in 
Southeast Asia (1968-1972) and Israeli air operations against Syrian forces in 
Lebanon (1982).   
2. Their RMA 
A separate Revolution in Military Affairs was in progress by the 1990s—
associated with contemporary terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda.  This 
Counter RMA drew upon insurgency warfare methods developed by Mao, Giap and 
others.  It also incorporated the technologies and methods of the rapidly developing 
information economy.  In particular, contemporary terrorists draw heavily upon 
internet communications to coordinate operations.   
                                            
6 The Soviets were likely the first to fully grasp the significance of the nascent RMA. 
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Therefore, we believe the foundations of the Terrorist RMA are composed of 
information technology applied to well-established models of insurgent and terrorist 
warfare.  Preferred modes of operation involve tactical invisibility, operational 
initiative and strategic patience.  What this RMA adds to traditional insurgent and 
terrorist methods is a third, “virtual” domain—units and operations linked and 
coordinated through cyberspace.  Domains of military operations are summarized in 
Table 1 below. 
Domain Mode of Operations Nature of Operations 





Second (embedded) Combatants disguised 
within general population 
Covert 
Physical 




Table 1. Domains of Warfare (a Contemporary Terrorist View) 
(Franck & Pierce, 2006) 
These RMAs are not independent events.  Just as the US-led RMA was a 
response to Soviet methods, the terrorists’ RMA is a response to current US 
methods.  A scheme for understanding the competitive nature of RMAs is offered in 
Franck and Hildebrandt (1996).  In particular, they provide a classification of 
countermeasures for those wishing to compete against a successful military 
innovator (such as the United States); these are summarized in Table 2 below.  
Basically, “emulating” measures are intended to counter new capabilities using the 
same basic methods as the enemy.  “Offsetting” measures aim to negate the new 
capabilities using different methods.  Finally, “bypassing” measures aim to make the 
new capabilities irrelevant or obsolete through a new set of capabilities.  In general, 
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Mirror Image (highly similar forces and modes of operation) Emulation 
Substitution (equivalent capabilities through different means) 
Defense (minimizing effects of opposing forces) Offset 
Disruption (dislocation of opposing operations) 
Avoidance (rendering opposing capabilities irrelevant) Bypassing 
Leapfrogging (making opposing capabilities obsolete) 
Table 2. Classification of Military Innovations in Military Competitions 
(Franck & Hildebrandt, 1996; Franck & Pierce, 2006) 
3. Our RMA vs. Theirs 
A comparison of the two ongoing RMAs is displayed in Table 3 below. 
RMA  




(especially as applied to 
communications and precision 
strike “kill chains”) 
Information Technology 
(especially as applied 







Preferred Modes of 
Operations 
High-speed, precise, 
operations at tactical and 






Perfect Opponents Soviet-style mechanized 
forces 
Liberal Democracies 
Table 3. Comparison of the Contemporary Revolutions in Military Affairs 
(Franck & Pierce, 2006) 
With the increase in speed and accuracy of information transfer (and methods 
for translating new information into new practices), the art of war has entered a 
period of hyperadaptivity.  Knowledge of new enemy tactics can be rapidly 
disseminated to friendly forces, with a view to more quickly finding successful 
countermeasures.  Likewise, friendly forces can rapidly receive news of their own 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 8 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
undertaken a large and diverse set of measures to counter the new terrorist 
capabilities. And, as stated above, these methods’ foundations are a combination of 
new technologies and older counterinsurgency methods.8 
However, as the US introduces countermeasures, the terrorists find and 
employ counter-countermeasures.  A significant part of the current rivalry involves a 
clash of competitive strategies.  The terrorists wish to impose a model of labor-
intensive warfare, while the US seeks to counter in its tradition of capital-intensive 
warfare.  Thus, for example, terrorists prefer combat operations in built-up urban 
zones, with protection from US firepower afforded by buildings and the civilian 
population.  US-style forces’ counters include improved sensors (such as very small 
reconnaissance UAVs), as well as more precise and low-yield weapons (such as the 
Small-Diameter Bomb).   
The general US intent is, therefore, usefully understood as an effort to apply 
technology- and capital-intensive solutions against a labor-intensive opponent.  
Thus, the new generation of land combat vehicles is a defensive counter to IEDs.  
The large-scale deployment of long-endurance reconnaissance (and sometimes 
strike) airborne vehicles is intended to disrupt terrorist insurgent operations with 
near-continuous presence of highly sophisticated sensors to deprive terrorists of 
their “cloaking” modes of operation (Seifert, 2007). 
4. Implications for Defense Industries 
These rapid changes in the means of warfare have changed the defense 
marketplace and can be expected to continue doing so.  Some of those effects can 
be associated with the US-led RMA, some with the terrorists’ Counter RMA. 
                                            
8 Professional military reading for the US military now includes works such as Horne, Small Wars 
Manual.  Alastair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (rev. ed.), NY: Penguin Books, 
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5. Some Changes Due to Our RMA 
The progression from platform-centric (systems) to network-centric (systems-
of-systems) warfare has likely accelerated the trend toward increasing complexity of 
military hardware.  Integrating the functions of new platforms (e.g., F-22 and DD-
1000) has itself become increasingly difficult.  However, there is a new dimension to 
this problem—integrating also a diverse set of military systems into a well-
functioning Reconnaissance-Strike Complex (system-of-systems).  The difficulties 
that have attended the US Navy’s cooperative engagement projects and various 
efforts to integrate the various parts of Ballistic Missile Defense complexes illustrate 
this point—even though they are arguably relatively small-scale compared to the 
Owens task of dominant awareness of a 200 nautical mile cube (Owens, 2000). 
Coincident with the new RMA is an era in which platforms look very much like 
“decadent technologies.”9.  That is, improvements to platforms themselves are likely 
to come at very high cost and to have diminishing operational impacts.  Tactical 
fighters provide a useful example.  What would have previously been regarded as 
very old airframes, such as the F-15 and F-16, are considered front-line combat 
aircraft, and are still strong candidates for countries seeking to purchase new 
aircraft.  For example, the F-16, a relatively old design, is still surprisingly attractive 
for those in the market for a first-rate fighter aircraft.10  We may, in fact, be entering 
an era in which tactical fighter aircraft (to take one example) wear out before they 
become obsolete.  The recent F-15 grounding over concerns about structural 
integrity illustrates this point.   
Also, fighters with the most significant additions in capability—such as the F-
22 Raptor (stealth) and Su-37 Bearkut or Flanker-F (maneuverability)—feature very 
                                            
9 The term “decadent technology” is associated with Mary Kaldor (1981), and is discussed more 
formally in Franck (1992).  Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, New York: Hill and Wang, 1981.  
Raymond E. Franck, Cost-Performance Choices in Post-Cold War Weapon Systems, Maxwell AFB, 
AL: Air University Press (AU-ARI-CPSS-91-11), Feb 1992. 
10 Pierre Tran, How France’s Rafale Lost Morocco Sale, DefenseNews, 15 October 2007.  Lockheed 
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high development and acquisition costs.  And the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a 
somewhat stealthy tactical fighter, has encountered significant increases in unit 
costs—even though it was originally represented as a relatively unambitious design 
that would fit into the defense budgets of many nations.11 
Accordingly, we may well be entering an era of recapitalization (replacement) 
for a wide variety of military platforms—as opposed to modernization through 
increased capability.  Two useful examples of “long service before obsolescence” 
are the US Air Force F-16 Falcon and the KC-135 Stratotanker.  The KC-45 program 
(in its current form) is more a hedge against KC-135 airframe aging than an 
embodiment of operationally significant, new technology.  Furthermore, the Boeing 
KC-767 and Northrop Grumman-EADS KC-30 (the KC-45 competitors) offered fewer 
advances in capability relative to the current mix of tankers (KC-135s and KC-10 
Extenders) than the KC-135A provided relative to the KC-97 Stratotanker and KB-
50s (tankers modified from the B-50 Superfortress bomber).  The F-16 continues to 
improve, but those enhancements are completely invisible to most outside 
observers.  F-16s are acquiring new capabilities through improvements in 
subsystems and the increased ability to engage in network-enabled combat 
operations.12  Moreover, the F-16 continues to compete well in international sales—
as the recent cases of India and Morocco illustrate. 
6. Some Changes Due to Our RMA vs. Theirs 
Changes in methods of warfare have, not surprisingly, implications for 
defense industries.  For example, mine- and IED-protected land combat vehicles 
have become major (and high-profile) defense acquisition projects.  Previously, the 
emphasis lay more with the aerospace sector.  This was true both in projects and in 
methods.  It was no coincidence, in our opinion, that Boeing (an aerospace 
                                            
11 JSF design philosophy is discussed in more detail below. 
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company) was chosen to be project lead for the US Army’s Future Combat Systems 
(FCS) project.  It is likewise no coincidence that combat vehicle purchases (such as 
MRAP(Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles) are of more traditional types. 
This change in the composition of demand for military hardware has potential 
for changing the structure of defense industries; new products are luring new firms 
into the defense market.  Thus, for example, there were only two serious proposals 
for the new US Air Force KC-45 aerial tanker—both of which come from well-
established defense industrial forms and one of which includes an airframe designed 
abroad.  In contrast, proposals for a new robot for combat operations have come 
from a number of companies, the majority of which are not among the major defense 
industrial firms. 
Finally, initiatives with the US DoD to field combat systems faster indicate 
(perhaps) an impetus toward major changes in business methods.  Counters to a 
hyperadaptive opponent indicate rapid implementation of new military solutions.  The 
hyperbureaucratized nature of the US defense acquisition process is directly at odds 
with the need for rapid change associated with these developments.  It’s reasonably 
safe to predict this disconnect will be a continuing source of stress for all suppliers of 
military establishments, such as the US DoD. 
B. Developments in the Global Defense Marketplace13 
As noted in the section above, defense industries worldwide are in an 
extended period of continuous, perhaps revolutionary, change.  The end of the Cold 
War in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 certainly caused major 
changes in the market for military goods and services.  But still greater changes 
were due to defense acquisition reform, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the 
                                            
13 This section is, in many respects, an updated version of an unpublished manuscript, Raymond E. 
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onset of information-age economies, globalization of economic activity, and the 
Counter RMA highly visible after September 11,  2001. 
However, it’s difficult to judge relative importance because these 
developments are closely related.  For example, the same basic technology 
underpins both the contemporary RMAs and information-age business practices.  
Information-age business, in turn, facilitates global commerce. The RMA was a 
major contributor to the difficulties that ultimately doomed the Soviet Union (Becker, 
1987).  The application of Information Technology (IT) to commerce has facilitated 
the long march toward economic globalization.  The Counter RMA associated with 
organizations such as Al Qaeda likewise exploits IT. 
1. Acquisition Reform 
Defense acquisition reform, particularly in the US, has been largely a 
consequence of the information age and the end of the Cold War.  With Warsaw 
Pact threats no longer at the center of military planning, it was clear that major 
reductions in industries supporting the military establishment could, and should, 
happen.  Moreover, with the rapid and extensive commercialization of IT, the role of 
the defense sector had changed considerably.  Defense was no longer a technical 
leader producing “spinoffs” for the rest of the economy.  Defense was now just 
another player in a very large market for IT products—especially important for 
military purposes because of the US-led RMA.  Moreover, the military sector has 
frequently been a “late adopter” or even a laggard in exploiting IT developments.  
This sluggishness was, at least in part, due to the procedural and regulatory 
apparatus inflicted upon the defense acquisition process (most notably the DSARC, 
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council process and its later avatars), plus the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)).  It was, therefore, clear that the US defense 
establishment would have to reconsider its methods of purchasing as well as the 
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During the Cold War, the sluggish West had the good fortune of facing 
opponents who were comparably sluggish; those days are over.  The issue of slow, 
plodding responses to threats has taken on particular significance in the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT).  The US and its allies now face flexible, opportunistic 
opponents–who are willing to switch weapons, modes of engagements, strategies, 
and (stated) political goals in order to win. (Hammes, 2004) On our side, we observe 
processes of acquisition and strategy formulation that are highly bureaucratic, 
legalistic and politicized.14.  Appropriated monies remain unspent; IED 
countermeasures lag enemy tactics because of devotion to bureaucratic punctilio (or 
“worship of process”).15   
While various types of rapid fielding initiatives have been in place for some 
time (e.g., the purchase of GPS sets for OPERATION DESERT STORM ground 
combat operations), it’s not clear that these new efforts constitute the seeds of 
meaningful reform.  It’s not clear that rapid fielding and the rest of the DoD 
acquisition system have yet worked out the modalities for coexistence. 
2. Globalization: Prosperity at a Price 
A period of economic growth that has been remarkable both for its length as 
well as resilience began after World War II.  In general, an epoch of “unrivaled 
prosperity” featured growth of international commerce that encompasses an ever-
increasing fraction of economic activity (e.g., Dornbusch, 2000).  While it was a 
major cause of growth and prosperity, expanding international trade has, by its very 
nature, increased economic specialization among nations.  This has proven an 
especially sensitive issue when interdependence means loss of self-sufficiency in 
military production. 
                                            
14 Franck & Pierce, 2006. 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 14 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
3. From Problem to Fact 
The rising tide of international trade and global markets threatened and then 
overwhelmed any realistic prospects for autarky in defense—even for the United 
States, where the situation was certainly taken seriously by the 1970s.  Arguably, 
the condition had passed beyond remedy even then.  When dependence on foreign 
suppliers first attained visibility as a policy issue, it was regarded as a problem, 
perhaps a crisis, to be remedied.  A number of measures were seriously studied in 
the 1970s and 1980s; the aims of these included: (a) preserving domestic 
capabilities in certain key components, like semiconductors, and (b) restricting 
foreign defense purchases to firms in politically reliable nations. 
Nonetheless, the foreign supplier “problem” continued. Indeed, the end of any 
close resemblance to defense self-sufficiency in the United States had ended before 
the Cold War did (Kapstein, 1992).  While the Warsaw Pact had a largely self-
contained defense industrial complex, self-sufficiency turned out to have been 
achieved at a very high price.  Their defense products were increasingly unable to 
keep pace with the ongoing RMA. 
With self-sufficiency diminishing, if not vanishing, in the industrial 
democracies and discredited in the Soviet bloc, interdependence in the defense 
sector came to be regarded by most as simply a fact of life.  At present, foreign 
suppliers are pervasive at the component and subsystem level.  It’s also clear that 
foreign sources for both sub-systems and platforms are now a matter of routine.  
While some resort to the international marketplace is due to offset agreements and 
similar arrangements, globalization would likely have made international supply 
chains inevitable in any case. 
4. From Fact to Opportunity 
With global downsizing of defense production after the Cold War, it became 
increasingly difficult to have meaningful competition for contract awards within 
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because of the obvious loss of bargaining advantage and lack of incentive for 
innovation.  A generally accepted corollary is that dealing with two suppliers is 
problematic for similar reasons.  There is no credible threat to let any one firm fail 
(which would lead to the unacceptable state of only one supplier).  Therefore, it 
would seem that the minimum acceptable number of firms for any major defense 
product is three firms (Rogerson, 1998). 
The problem is that with scarcity of new production contracts (caused, inter 
alia, by funding declines and unit cost increases), the market simply cannot support 
a base with: (a) a competitively attractive number of suppliers of (b) economically 
efficient size, and (c) within national borders, even US borders.  The United States, 
for example, could look to several credible sources for new fighter aircraft in the 
early 1980s: General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop and Grumman—with 
Lockheed. Martin, Fairchild and Boeing as potential players also.  After the 
downsizing, only two domestic firms (Lockheed Martin and Boeing, after acquiring 
McDonnell Douglas) could offer a credible proposal for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF).  This is a serious problem for defense acquisition planners. 
In recent years, US policy makers have begun to regard globalization as a 
tool for solving that problem.  Foreign suppliers are to be regarded as full-scale 
candidates for prime contracts for major systems.  The EADS/Airbus consortium 
(with Northrop Grumman as its North American partner) was encouraged to offer a 
proposal for a new US Air Force aerial tanker, which won the competition in March 
2008..  
5. From Opportunity…to Problem 
What’s stated above is a reasonable characterization of defense market 
globalization, particularly as viewed in US policy circles.  However, defense 
production isn’t just another item of international commerce.  Defense industries are 
especially important to their nations.  The rise of the nation-state in Europe (codified 
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revolutions of the 16th and 17th centuries, which led to economies of scale for nation-
states in providing for defense (Krepinevich, 1993; Parker, 1996).  This implies a 
special status for the capacity to produce military goods within national borders— 
that arguably goes directly to the fundamental character of the nation-state.  Hence, 
even that radical free trader Adam Smith acknowledged defense production as a 
special case for self sufficiency in the Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776).   
The result has been a certain ambiguity in many nations.  While there’s a 
consensus in favor of free trade on both a regional and global basis, there are strong 
reservations about extending that regime to military goods and services.  Kapstein 
(1992) provides an excellent characterization of this attitude: 
states have had an ambivalent relationship with the international economy 
when it comes to matters of national security.  With the development of the 
state system in the seventeenth century, and the military revolution that 
coincided with it, rulers increasingly felt the need to maintain in their grasp at 
least some war-fighting capability.  This meant having a pool of trained men, 
along with industries capable of defense production, within the borders of the 
state or its imperial reach.  (p. 21, emphasis added) 
What this means is that the logic underpinning the growth of international 
trade in general is much less compelling for military goods.  Calculations of most 
efficient supplier will not likely be compelling in “make or import” decisions for 
military equipment.  For a number of reasons, including sense of nationhood, 
governments can be expected to favor domestic sources in various ways. 
Even if military hardware is imported, purchasing nations will frequently insist 
on “offsets” (or similar arrangements) to accompany imports of military equipment.  
Those offsets generally (but not always) involve some benefit for the indigenous 
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sub-system purchases, shared production, licensed production, or technical 
transfers.16   
A corollary to the need for domestic defense industries is a need for export 
sales.  Very few national military establishments can generate sufficient orders to 
sustain a weapons source of efficient size in any category.  The clear implication is 
that globalization in defense industries will not follow the same trends seen in other 
areas.  It’s reasonable to expect that there will be more firms making military 
hardware than standard calculations of market size would indicate, with that extra 
capacity being the direct result of national defense and industrial policies.   
It’s also reasonably safe to predict that international military commerce will be 
perpetually subject to what economists generally call non-tariff barriers.  Arms 
exports will remain increasingly tied to special arrangements between buyer and 
seller.  This is not new.  But there are features in the contemporary defense 
marketplace which accentuate the importance of those arrangements.  First, there 
has been a general problem of overcapacity in the defense industries following the 
Cold War.  For the reasons described above, arms-producing countries have been 
reluctant to shed excess capacity.  At the same time, successfully modernizing 
countries (such as Turkey and South Korea) have shown increasing interest in 
domestic defense production capabilities. 
Finally, it is entirely possible that firms having a substantial stake in defense 
exports will strive to preempt these trends through acquisitions and strategic 
partnerships involving foreign arms concerns—and through other means described 
in Bitzinger (1998).   
                                            
16 Offsets can take other forms as well, such as purchase of nonmilitary goods from the buying 
country.  Likewise, they can serve a number of purposes besides enhancing domestic defense 
industries.  Udis & Maskus (2001), for example, argues that offset arrangements can, and do, 
constitute a means of circumventing protectionist legislation (e.g., Buy American requirements and 
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6. Bottom Line: Some Systemic Tensions 
These developments (both new and continuing) have produced a number of 
systemic tensions in the defense marketplace.  Basically, the Westphalian ideal of 
defense industrial capacity as both manifestation and bulwark of national 
sovereignty has been in a period of long-term decline.  On balance, there’s good 
reason to believe the disparity between the sovereignty ideal and the industrial 
realities will continue to increase.  This has a number of implications: 
Defense industrial capabilities will be maintained, and indeed developed, for 
reasons other than the likelihood of profit.  New great powers such as China and 
India are likely to continue to develop significant domestic capabilities.  Similar 
initiatives can, likewise, be expected from successfully modernizing regional powers 
such as Brazil, Turkey and the Republic of Korea. 
It’s reasonable to expect that the logic of nationhood will lead to some forms 
of compensation for imported arms.  While these have traditionally been in the form 
of offsets, the game is getting more complicated—to include more emphasis on 
industrial participation, licensed production, technical transfer, and other forms of 
long-term relationships among defense industrial firms.  Securing appropriate levels 
of national control will be an important part of defense policy for many arms 
importers, including the United States.  It will also be a key policy foundation for 
nations such as the United Kingdom—a discussion to follow in this report. 
Likewise, long-term overcapacity will lead to highly competitive efforts to 
secure Foreign Military Sales (FMS)  In particular, European firms are highly 
dependent on exports.  This export imperative will drive extraordinary efforts to win 
sales.17  At best, we’ll see an interesting buyers’ market.  At worst, the global 
defense trade could become a zero-sum scramble for defense industrial sovereignty. 
                                            
17 For example, EADS’ efforts to overturn C-130 sales to Canada by appealing to the parliamentary 
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C. Current US and European Defense Industrial 
Developments 
This section describes the current state of the US and European defense 
industries.  One of the difficulties attendant to making such a comparison is defining 
what constitutes “Europe.”  One could use the 27 members of the European Union 
(EU), for example, but that would exclude Norway, a member of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and a growing armaments producer.  Including only the 
23 European members of NATO would exclude Sweden, a traditionally neutral 
country but that is closely linked to Europe through significant arms purchases and 
sales and membership in the EU.  Accordingly, we have chosen to follow the 
(variable) definition of “Europe” provided in our source materials, with remarks as 
necessary to include clarification.  
Table 4 provides a general perspective on the relative size of the world’s 
largest weapons producers; six are headquartered in the US, and four are in Europe.  
The most recent available data from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) indicates that 40 US companies represented 63% of the combined 
Top 100 arms sales of $290 billion in 2005. Some 32 “West European”18 companies 
accounted for another 29% of world armaments sales (SIPRI, 2007).  With respect 
to sales of weapons, the European aerospace and defense market is considered to 
represent sales of $234.9 billion; while the US aerospace and defense market has 
been estimated at $502.6 billion19 (Datamonitor, 2006a; 2006b). 
The above figures and Table 4 illustrate a few preliminary thoughts, which we 
will discuss further below.  First, when Europe is viewed as a group of countries 
(even though the choice of exactly which countries varies), the overall size of its 
defense market and armaments firms are smaller than the US, but not dwarfed 
                                            
18 SIPRI does not define which countries are included in this region. 
19 This estimate defines Europe as consisting of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
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entirely by the latter.  Integration among European firms, as shown by the creation of 
Munich-based EADS, a Franco-German-Spanish company, creates economies of 
scale and scope that give these entities a better opportunity to compete both at 
home and worldwide.  Furthermore, EADS is the sole owner of Airbus, giving it some 
of the benefits of combined military-civil synergies that Boeing and other US firms 
have long enjoyed.  During 2006, 24% of EADS’ sales were to the US and Canada, 
a figure which includes Airbus (Masson, 2007, p. 6).   
Table 4. Top Ten Largest Arms-producing Companies, 2005 
(SIPRI (2005), cited in Jones (2006, p. 263) 
Company Country Arms Sales  
(US$ Millions) 
Lockheed Martin United States 24,910 
Boeing United States 24,370 
Northrop Grumman United States 22,720 
BAE Systems United Kingdom 15,760 
Raytheon United States 15,450 
General Dynamics United States 13,100 
Thales France 8,350 
EADS France, Germany, Spain 8,010 
United Technologies United States 6,210 
Finmeccanica Italy 5,290 
 
EADS’ military sales to North America have been rather limited in the past.  
That said, should the KC-30 tanker/transport (which uses the Airbus A330 as a 
platform and is a joint venture with Northrop Grumman) survive the current bid 
protest by Boeing and be purchased by the US Air Force, then EADS’ sales and 
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The largest European defense firm, BAE Systems, represents a more 
Atlanticist approach to arms sales.  In 2006, 40% of the firm’s sales were to the US 
and Canada, with a stated goal of 50%; the firm already represents one of the six 
largest suppliers to the US Department of Defense (DoD).  Furthermore, the firm is a 
model of vertical (as well as horizontal) integration, having absorbed almost the 
entirety of the United Kingdom’s storied aircraft industry—with BAE being the largest 
non-US participant in the F-35 Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.  The 
company’s strategy of a significant presence within the US became evident in 2005 
when BAE acquired United Defense, well known for its armored vehicles, followed 
by its purchase of Armor Holdings in 2007 (Masson, 2007, pp. 7-8).  
Similar strategies of consolidation have created the remainder of the firms 
listed in Table 4.  Thales is notable as a merger of a large number of French defense 
electronics companies and has become a leading supplier of software-defined radios 
to the US DoD, with an initial contract stated by the DoD to be worth $3.5 to $9 
billion (Taverna, 2007). Finmeccanica’s Alenia is partnering with L-3 
Communications and Boeing in the $2.04 billion DoD acquisition of the C-27J 
Spartan tactical transport aircraft (Gettle, 2007); the airframe will be an adaptation of 
an Alenia commuter aircraft.  Finmeccanica is also acquiring British defense-related 
firms.  One French study suggests two main reasons for Finmeccanica’s strategy: 
first, in order to have UK-based facilities that will qualify under the UK Defence 
Industrial Strategy (UK Ministry of Defence, 2005); and second, as an indirect entry 
to the US-UK “perimeter” that has been established recently.20   
Within that perimeter, the export and technology control policies of both 
countries have been significantly relaxed (Bruno, 2007).  The same study suggests, 
however, that the price of Finmeccanica’s acquisitions may be a loss of collaborative 
European business (Masson, 1997, p. 36).  France’s somewhat autarkic attitude is 
perhaps also understood when it is noted that the country has stated its desire to 
                                            





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 22 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
remain the world’s third largest arms exporter, with €4 billion in exports in 2005.  
However, the new President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, has launched a wide-
ranging consultation and policy development exercise on defense and national 
security, including industrial base and procurement issues (Conseil économique et 
social, 2007; Premier Ministre, 2007). 
In reviewing the differences in weapons procurement, some attention should 
be paid to the relative size of the US and European economies as well as of defense 
spending.  Using 2006 data, the US and the 27 nations of the EU have about the 
same GDP (€11,860 billion vs. €12,140 billion respectively), while US defense 
expenditures are about twice those of the EU (€404.4 billion vs. €213.1 billion).  Not 
surprisingly, defense spending as a percentage of GDP follows the same pattern, 
about 3.4% in the US vs. 1.8% in the EU (Conseil économique et social, 2007). 
The above data demonstrate that the US spends more on defense in both 
absolute and relative terms.  Yet, as shown in Table 4, the major European defense 
firms are quite large, and as discussed above, “Western European” firms represent 
29% of global arms sales (SIPRI, 2007).  It is, therefore, inevitable that exports and 
multinational collaboration are more important for European firms, given the relative 
paucity of domestic defense budgets. 
However, it should be emphasized that US defense spending has risen 
rapidly since the attacks of 11 September 2001, and the subsequent invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  While European nations (and weapons) have participated in 
both conflicts, EU countries have not shown the capability to increase their spending 
to anything approaching the current US level, which can be informally estimated to 
be about $700 billion annually.  The informed observer would also note substantial 
downstream costs to repair or replace large quantities of US military equipment 
ahead of schedule due to damage and unforeseen rates and types of wear in a 
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1. The “Last Supper” and US Consolidation 
Certainly, the post-Cold War era has ushered in a wave of consolidation as 
well as unprecedented transatlantic industrial partnerships.  Contrary perhaps to 
received wisdom, it is difficult to state that the US and European defense industries 
are developing as parallel “fortresses.”  It appears rather that firms and governments 
on both sides of the Atlantic are pursuing strategies that integrate autonomy and 
interdependence.  We will delve into how the current situation came about. 
Jones (2006) has suggested that considerable evidence exists that EU states 
are gradually building a “strong and integrated defense industrial base.”  In addition 
to increasing their ability to compete with (and collaborate with) the US defense 
industry, European firms are also reacting to post-Cold War changes in the US 
defense industrial base. 
Hensel and Wood (2007) have noted that the number of large US defense 
contractors (defined as those who collectively supply over 70% of the DoD’s needs) 
has consolidated significantly—from 17 in 1989 to 5 in 1997.  The authors also found 
that 1529 US defense mergers had been announced between June 1978 and June 
2005. 
It would be logical to conclude that the US consolidation reflected in Table 4 
was due to the search for economies of scale and scope in a technologically 
sophisticated industry, driven (inter alia) by the need to integrate hardware and 
software into increasingly complex systems.   
During the 1990s, there was also a general trend toward reduced defense 
expenditures, with policy makers pursuing the hoped-for “peace dividend” 
associated with the end of the Cold War.  In a somewhat unusual action within the 
US government, the Secretary of Defense (Les Aspin) and his Deputy (William 
Perry) held a private dinner in 1993 for the heads of major US defense contractors 
(referred to by some authors, perhaps inappropriately, as “The Last Supper”).  After 
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market, with a warning about decreasing procurement budgets and the need for 
economies of scale to maintain global competitiveness (Jones, 2006; Skapinker, 
1999).  This government “suggestion,” rare in a capitalist society but perhaps 
appropriate given the DoD’s effective monopsony, may have encouraged the wave 
of US defense industry mergers and acquisitions that followed during the second 
half of the Nineties (Skapinker,1999; Van Scherpenberg, 1997).  One could also 
venture to suggest that Aspin and Perry foresaw the effects of the European defense 
industry developments, resulting from the establishment of the EU.   
Of course, at the time of the “Last Supper,” the tragic events of 11 September 
2001 had not yet occurred, nor had the “Long War” (or Global War on Terrorism) yet 
begun.  These events have since led to a significant increase in US defense 
expenditures, as well as significant procurement spending by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), created in 2003 as a result of the 11 September 2001 
attacks.  The now larger, integrated US defense contractors that survived the 
Nineties found themselves well positioned to supply the Long War (also fought by 
US allies, including Australia, Britain, and Canada) and to meet the needs of the 
DHS.  These events were definitely not factors envisaged as the Berlin Wall fell or 
when the “Last Supper” was held. 
Jones (2006) also suggested that the end of the Cold War led to a significant 
decline in (a) transatlantic collaborative projects, as well as (b) transatlantic mergers 
and acquisitions, accompanied by an increase in these two types of activities within 
both the US and the EU.  However, a more comprehensive study for RAND by 
Lorell, Lowell, Moore, Greenfield, & Vlachos (2002, pp. xxi-xxiii) determined that: 
 Numerous innovative cross-border strategic market-sector agreements 
initiated by US and foreign companies are emerging. 
 Consolidated European and other foreign firms mean potentially more 
equal partners, as well as stronger competitors. 
 European and other foreign firms view the acquisition of US firms as 
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The above authors went on to suggest (p. 183) that a small number of case 
studies be selected in order to determine patterns of collaboration among US and 
European firms. 
2. The Dangers of Reductionism 
We are struck by the challenges inherent in undertaking quantitative analyses 
of the defense industries on both sides of the Atlantic.  Accordingly we have 
reservations about the likely results of any such studies and resulting policy 
recommendations.  We hope that we have made clear that there is a large, 
worldwide defense industry dominated by the US and Europe.  An independent 
French research organization recently conducted a study of the current state of the 
European defense industry (Masson & Paulin, 2007). The study was requested by 
the French defense ministry and covers 188 closely spaced pages and thousands of 
firms, financial transactions of all kinds, codevelopment, coproduction and other 
types of mutual agreements and government acquisitions of military systems.  All of 
these are occurring between the 27 EU states, the US and Canada, as well as the 
rest of the world.  
We wondered what the authors, having catalogued and discussed this tidal 
wave of activity, would conclude.  Understandably perhaps, no quantitative analysis 
was done.  The study, on its last page, moved from data collection to one paragraph 
of analysis and three recommendations, which are summarized as follows: 
The EU should be responsible for a policy framework on issues such as 
transfers of people, the standardization of practices such as bidding, and managing 
the convergence and commonality of certain defense and security requirements and 
systems. 
Bilateral or multilateral agreements between individual EU member states 
should cover exploratory research and development.  Production should be 
performed within the 27 member states, while favoring management of the 
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National governments should remain responsible for sovereignty-related 
issues, regulation of financial markets and corporate activities, as well as defense 
employment, foreign defense equipment imports, and minor projects. (pp. 185-7) 
The above statements link well with the French government’s use of the EU 
as a mechanism for leveraging Europe to support French sovereignty.  Part of 
France’s goal in this regard is the almost continual promotion of the EU as an 
emerging military coalition with the capability to deploy forces, ostensibly at UN 
request (Permanent Representation of France to the European Union, 2006).   
However, France continues on the parallel course of promoting exports of 
strictly French products, as seen during an attempt to sell the Dassault Rafale to 
Morocco, which eventually chose the Lockheed Martin F-16 Falcon.  Despite the 
Rafale’s much higher cost and complexity that were perhaps a little too much for 
Morocco’s limited needs, France pushed the sale very hard, given that no exports 
have yet materialized for this advanced aircraft (El País, 2007a). 
French policy, taken as a whole, appears to be substantially different from the 
more Atlanticist and domestically oriented UK Defence Industrial Strategy (UK 
Ministry of Defence, 2005).  As we will discuss, the British approach parses the 
spectrum of defense systems and defines with a reasonable level of clarity where 
the boundaries between independence and collaboration or dependence lie.  
Furthermore, the UK and France differ significantly in their perception of the role of 
the EDA as a supplement to or replacement for national decision-making. 
Yet it is significant that even such major policy differences have not precluded 
the two countries from collaborating on a major binational project: the joint 
development and construction of three aircraft carriers with a “Common Baseline 
Design” (UK Ministry of Defence, 2007): two for the UK and one for France.  The UK 
government will pay approximately €2.85 billion to build each carrier, while the 
French ship will cost about €2.5 billion.  BAE, Thales, and the French-government 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 27 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Each country will equip its carrier with distinctive national systems as well as 
aircraft.  The Royal Navy will use the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (once that aircraft 
replaces the Harrier GR7 or GR9), and France’s Marine nationale will use the 
Dassault-built Rafale (currently entering carrier service on the Charles de Gaulle) as 
their fixed-wing combat aircraft.  Interestingly, the future French vessel will continue 
to feature three Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeye surveillance aircraft onboard.   
Finally, in order to make the project practical in terms of cooperation with the 
UK, the French president decided to revert to conventional propulsion for the new 
carrier—unlike its nuclear-powered predecessor, the Charles de Gaulle (Marine 
nationale, 2007; Masson & Paulin, 2007, p. 187).  The Royal Navy uses nuclear 
propulsion only aboard submarines.  The above example demonstrates the sheer 
difficulty of attempting to discern any common strategic policies on armaments 
between the UK and France; their strategies appear both opportunistic and practical, 
neither of which is a criticism.   
The more limited study by Lorell et al. (2002), having briefly reviewed 25 
collaborative projects between the US and European nations, came to some 
preliminary conclusions (see the above section of this paper), but recommended the 
need for detailed case analyses of two such projects in order to form a basis for 
eventual policy recommendations.  Vlachos-Dengler (2002, p. xi), in a study of 
European defense industrial capabilities, came to the following conclusion: Structural 
relationships between players are extremely complex, justifying their being 
characterized as “the European spaghetti bowl.”  There is a multitude of cross-
shareholding relationships, joint ventures and consortia, often formed around 
specific programs but occasionally evolving into more permanent structures. 
Robert Trice (2007), Senior Vice President, Business Development of 
Lockheed Martin, presented the relationships between US, European, Israeli and 
Asian firms in a similar way, with a diagram showing a large number of linkages 
related to a few projects.  In Trice’s view, even this limited set was too complex to 
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governments: “Engage industry to promote a common understanding of defense and 
civil gov’t strategies and acquisition objectives.”  Vlachos-Dengler (2002, p. 170) 
concludes her review by discussing the results of the above trends: 
It is interesting to note that consolidation in the European defense industry 
may have produced one of the least efficient market structures for that 
industry because an oligopolistic market structure, such as the one it currently 
has, tends to produce more excess capacity than either a monopolistic or 
competitive market.  At the same time, those firms that have remained in the 
defense industry have become much larger, with more-specialized weapons 
systems integration capability, and they will compete fiercely with their rivals 
to produce the next generation or leading-edge weapons systems.   
As a result, governments inadvertently may have found a replacement for the 
technological competition of less-concentrated market structures—the intense 
oligopolistic competition among the high-technology defense contractors committed 
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III. Analytical Frameworks 
As indicated, we began this study with the hypothesis that offsets (even in 
more complex and sophisticated forms) have become less useful in understanding 
international trade in defense products.  If so, one possible line of research is to 
develop complementary models to clarify the complexities of the contemporary 
defense market, especially its international dimensions. 
Accordingly, we begin with a discussion of analysis with multiple models 
(Section A).  A natural starting point for this methodology is Graham Allison’s use of 
multiple explanatory models to explain the complex events of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of 1962 (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelokow, 1999).  Section B presents the 
offsets perspective of international defense trade.   
Section C presents a summary of the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
theory of enterprise behavior.  TCE was developed first as a means of studying the 
“vertical” boundaries of firms.21  For purposes of our current inquiry, we extend the 
basic TCE perspective by viewing nation states as defense enterprises—whose 
preferred mode of operation is a vertically integrated defense establishment (military 
forces and associated defense production capabilities).   
Finally, we present a corporate strategy perspective based on the Five Forces 
and “Co-opetition” (Section D).  Among other things, this permits exploration of our 
hypothesis that defense industrial firms are, for a number of reasons, becoming 
more important players in the global defense market.   
                                            
21 Vertical boundaries of a firm refers basically to how much of the supply chain is subsumed within 
the firm.  Thus, for example, an automobile manufacturer that includes a tire-making division is 
vertically integrated.  Closely related subjects are the intricacies of the “make-or-buy” (or outsourcing) 
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A. Analysis with Multiple Models 
The systematic use of multiple explanatory paradigms to analyze complex 
situations is generally associated with Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision (1971; 
Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  Allison applied this approach the problem of explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.  He introduced three separate explanatory models (I, II 
and III) as means to better understand the decisions made by the major players—
both the US and Soviets.   
Model I’s unit of analysis is the unitary rational actor; who operates on the 
basis of well-considered decisions in pursuit of his interests.22  Model II, 
Organizational Processes, focuses (not surprisingly) on organizations and their 
operation through established processes.  Model II seeks to understand the 
dynamics that result from organizations seeking to exercise their established (and 
preferred) modes of operation.  Model III considers agencies within the context of a 
larger organization containing a number of similar agencies; it emphasizes the 
interaction of these agencies.  Those interactions may be rivalrous, cooperative, or 
some mixture of conflict and collusion.  Model III is, therefore, termed “organizational 
politics.” 
Associated with each model is a set of key propositions, a propensity to pose 
a different set of questions and arrive at a different set of answers to any given 
question.  Allison characterized the three separate perspectives as follows.   
Model I: National policy is viewed as the result of the deliberations leading to 
rational choices.23  Decisions are therefore usefully understood as the results of 
assessing available policy alternatives against national objectives and resources 
available.  Basically, policy can be explained (and predicted) by careful 
consideration of the rational course of action, given objectives and circumstances. 
                                            
22 Originating basically in standard microeconomics. 
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Model II: Policy is the result of the operation of various organizational 
processes—understood through appropriate consideration of organizational 
components, functions and modes of behavior (standard operating procedures and 
organizational repertoires).  Policy, therefore, arises from organizational context and 
organizational reaction to the situation presented. 
Model III: Policy is the result of interaction and bargaining among various 
organizations within the government.  Model III explanations involve consideration of 
relevant players, what shapes their opinions and positions, and the nature of the 
arena (“action channel”) in which this interaction takes place. 
The Essence of Decision methodology features separate applications of the 
various models to the understanding of complex situations and events.  “Because 
simplifications are necessary, competing simplifications are necessary” (Allison and 
Zelikow, 1999, p. 8).  In short, complex phenomena are best understood when 
viewed from a number of well-defined perspectives.  The analytical messiness 
arising from use of “multiple, overlapping and competing conceptual frameworks” is 
an acceptable cost when weighed against the enhanced understanding possible with 
these multiple models. 
Proceeding from the basic assessment above, we intend to apply multiple 
models to understanding our defense industrial “cases” later in this report.  However, 
our menu of models is not the same as those used to understand the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  Our set of explanatory paradigms consists of Offsets in defense industrial 
practice, Transaction Cost Economics, and standard models of corporate strategy—
as discussed in the sections following. 
B. Offsets and International Industrial Participation 
While we started this effort with reservations about offsets as a 
comprehensive paradigm for understanding international defense trade, we also 
understand the model’s usefulness in explaining contemporary events.  There is a 
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with an extensive body of practical experience.  Doing justice to the offsets model 
accordingly entails the detailed (and relatively lengthy) exposition that follows. 
1. Offsets: Definition, Goals and Theory   
Offsets in international defense trade became ubiquitous in sales of 
technologically advanced equipment beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
The most common offset agreement commits the selling firm to perform some non-
market requirement as a necessary condition for the sale.  Such requirements vary 
widely, ranging from an agreement by the seller to purchase products and/or 
services from the buying country essentially unrelated to the equipment sale being 
negotiated, to explicit transfer of technology, investment, and various co-production 
arrangements.  Commitments involving work by industry of the buying country on the 
product whose sale is being negotiated are described as direct offsets, while other 
unrelated arrangements are known as indirect offsets.   
Some observers have likened offsets to barter, but this view is misleading.  In 
the view of a careful student of the offset phenomenon:  
The concept of added reciprocity is central to the practice.  This is the notion 
that the transaction should create some economic activity over and above 
that which would occur if it were only a cash transaction.  That is, the purpose 
of counter-trade [offsets] is not to avoid the use of cash for an exchange of 
goods or services; rather, it is to have some added impact or effect beyond 
the exchange of goods per se. (Hammond, 1990, p. 5)  
Since such transactions occur outside conventional market operations, many 
economic theorists stamp them as trade diverting and, hence, welfare reducing.  
This position has been repeatedly uttered and has almost assumed mantra-like 
quality.  The “diversion” refers to the forceful twisting away of the terms of a 
transaction from those likely to have evolved optimally in a competitive market, 
usually as a result of monopoly influence.  The applicability of the familiar efficiency 
argument for a simple market exchange is based upon the assumption of a 
competitive market structure.  The imperfectly competitive nature of the aerospace 
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misallocation under free trade.  Under such circumstances, trade or industrial policy 
may be introduced to counter such distortions in what may be reasonably described 
as a second-best case.  
In the defense case, the buyer is a government agency, again suggesting that 
the assumptions of market competition may be misapplied.  Additionally, economists 
have usually concentrated on a single goal in identifying an optimal policy—with 
limited, if any, attention focused on other goals in the social calculus of public 
decision-making.  Multiple policy objectives which characterize real-world decision-
making by government officials convert a theoretically optimal policy for the 
attainment of a single goal into a mutually contradictory mélange. 
Practical realities often require policy makers to adopt a broad approach to 
the selection of programs that advance simultaneously several objectives in a 
somewhat consistent way, while steering around the several political and economic 
constraints that narrow the range of available alternatives.  In such an environment, 
offsets may indeed offer a relatively safe route through a dangerous mine field, or, in 
technical terms, an efficient contract.  Such multidimensional contracts challenge the 
popular theoretical view that all dimensions can be translated into money at a 
common and objectively determined rate in a competitive market.  Thus, the 
emergence of a lower price for the buyer may not automatically prove to be the 
optimal solution. 
In an international market for advanced technology products, participants face 
uncertain product quality, imperfect competition, and a complex contract-
enforcement climate.  In such an environment—one with substantial inhibitions to 
the unfettered use of price variations to adjust to changing conditions of supply and 
demand—bargaining is a natural development.   
Several distinguished economists have recognized these developments; a 
sample of their views may prove instructive.  Williamson has commented on the 
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contracting as proof of attempts to monopolize rather than simply to economize on 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1985).  Recent growth in the arms trade, information 
technology, and training has led Michael Intriligator (among others) to suggest that 
analysis may have to proceed beyond traditional classical theories that evolved in a 
world of trade in basic commodities (Intriligator, 1987, pp. 364-369).   
Goals: Since offsets are usually demanded by the buyer, focus on goals will 
here be limited to the perspective of the buyer.  Historically, a wide array of goals 
has been reflected in offset negotiations.  A study of offset terms reveals such 
objectives as economizing in the use of what may have appeared to be scarce 
foreign exchange; providing jobs and production for domestic labor and industry 
(and, simultaneously, a defense against attacks from domestic political foes for 
enriching foreigners at the expense of citizens); acquiring valuable technology and 
training that will advance the competitiveness of local industry and perhaps spread 
from the defense industry to the broader economy; and a means to circumvent 
foreign “buy-national” requirements and, thus, enhance the export potential of 
domestic industry.  The popularity of these goals has changed over time and space, 
varying with such factors as foreign exchange rates,  perception of national security 
environment, level of industrial development, level of economic growth, offset 
experience, etc.  The diversity of such goals and the factors influencing them make 
any effort to evaluate their results and impact in the aggregate most difficult.  
However, given the widespread appearance of technology acquisition in offset 
history, it may be useful to examine the theory of technology transfer to understand 
why the offset model appears to be a convenient avenue to consummate such 
transfers.   
Critics of offsets often ask why such a desire to acquire advanced technology 
isn’t addressed more directly through purchase of the technology in the market 
rather than through the more circuitous route of participating in an offset 
arrangement.  In an important article, Teece has criticized the portrayal of the firm by 
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transformations.  He objects to this conceptualization, since it implies a firm’s 
behavior as stored in symbolic form in “a book of blueprints” (Teece, 1982, pp. 39-
63, especially p. 43).24   
Teece challenges this “book of blueprints” metaphor, stressing the tacit nature 
of much individual knowledge that can be articulated only with difficulty.  He 
observes “in the exercise of individual skill, many actions are taken that are not the 
result of considered choices but rather are automatic responses that constitute 
aspects of skill” (1982, p. 44).  When transferring this concept from the individual to 
the routine operations of a business organization, “much that could in principle be 
deliberated is instead done automatically in response to signals arising from the 
organization or its environment” (p. 44).  Thus, organizational memory exists, and it 
is based on routines.  Members of the organization must be able to receive and 
interpret information arising from within the organization and its environment in order 
to trigger an appropriate response from their “repertoire.”  Since technology transfer 
between firms involves a shift across organizational boundaries, the transmission of 
an individual’s knowledge of a routine separated from its context may be 
unsuccessful. 
Even if one assumes that both parties are aware of the opportunity to gain via 
exchange, and buyers acknowledge the existence of valuable information for which 
they are willing to pay, much more than a “simple” market exchange is usually 
necessary.  As already noted, the exchange of technology has powerful tacit and 
“learning-by-doing” characteristics, which often require that individual and 
organizational knowledge and experience accompany the transfer of purely technical 
information and data.  Open reciprocal information is necessary both to identify and 
disclose opportunities which may exist for the exchange of information as well as to 
aid the actual transfer.  The parties in such a situation are linked in what Williamson 
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has labeled a “small numbers trading relation,” which carries risks for both parties 
arising out of strategic manipulation of information or misrepresentation of intentions 
(Williamson, 1975, pp. 26-28).  Specific examples include a “seller exposed to 
hazards such as the possibility that the buyer will employ the knowledge in subtle 
ways not covered by the contract, or the buyer [leapfrogging] the licensor’s 
technology and [becoming] an unexpected competitive threat.”  Alternatively, “the 
buyer is exposed to hazards such as the seller asserting that the technology has 
better performance or cost reducing characteristics than is actually the case, or the 
seller might render promised transfer assistance in a perfunctory fashion” (Teece, 
1982, p. 52).  After raising the possibility of bonding or performance guarantees as 
possible ways to reduce risk, Teece notes that so long as the measurement of the 
performance of the technology is ambiguous, “costly haggling” might still ensue. 
Williamson sees the answer to this vexing problem in what he calls “relational 
contracting” and one such example bears a strong resemblance to the direct offset 
structure where a form of bilateral governance emerges under which the autonomy 
of the parties is maintained (Williamson, 1979, pp. 250-252).  Here, independent 
firms engage in trade—with both parties committed to the maintenance of a friendly 
and cooperative relationship as a goal of greater value than possible short-term 
gains available through opportunistic behavior.  A carefully designed offset 
arrangement may also rely upon reputation effects and principal-agent relations to 
furnish powerful incentives for the provider of technology to ensure a completely 
successful transfer.  
Reputation effects are more likely to be effective in the case of a product 
which is well known, especially when the seller’s product name is familiar.  Thus, in 
the first decade and a half or so of its life, most informed stories in the press referred 
not to the F-16 but to the “General Dynamics F-16.”  This helped motivate the 
General Dynamics Corporation to ensure that transfers of technology to partner 
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besmirching the GD name.  In the case of the Joint Strike Fighter, Lockheed Martin 
is similarly vulnerable.25 
Reputation effects are also an element in many principal-agent cases, in 
which the challenge is to devise systems which minimize the potential conflict 
between groups which may not necessarily share the same goals.  Such cases may 
be found in the relations between owners and hired managers, managers and 
employees, or even physicians and patients.   In the last case, one is reminded of 
the implicit contracts which exist to control the tendency of doctors to prescribe more 
medical care than their patients might prefer.  The preference of surgeons for a 
surgical option and of radiologists for their specialty is well known.  Fortunately, 
there are a number of factors in the physician-patient relationship which serve to 
bring the differing interests closer together.  Patients are not obliged to accept their 
doctor’s recommendation for treatment, and they may seek a second opinion.  In 
extreme cases, physician behavior may be influenced by the existence of peer 
review boards, which certainly can influence reputations (Nicholson, 1990, p. 302).  
In the international trade in defense environment, as well, the challenge for the buyer 
is to formulate a system which provides an incentive for the seller to seriously accept 
the buyer’s objective as his own.26 
Such an explanation as to why several offset arrangements appear attractive 
does not constitute an endorsement of the offset route as the optimal strategy.  
However, it does suggest why, in many cases, buyers have selected that route to 
achieve their objectives.  Policymakers who, for whatever reason, object to the offset 
option will likely be more successful if they can suggest alternative (and presumably 
less onerous) policies to buying states which can better help them to attain their 
goals.  Understanding the objectives of buying states is essential to that 
recommendation. 
                                            
25 McLeod (2007) offers a comprehensive treatment of reputation effects.  
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2. US Offset Data: Collection and Findings  
Reporting Requirements: Section 309 of the 1986 amendments to the 
Defense Production Act (DPA) dealt with the topic of offsets in defense trade.  It 
mandated that the President submit an annual report to Congress on the impact of 
offsets on the US defense industrial base.  The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) was assigned to coordinate an interagency committee consisting of 
representatives from the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Labor, Treasury, and 
the Office of the US Trade Representative.   A series of annual reports were 
prepared and issued by this committee between 1986 and 1990.  They included 
relevant statistics on offsets and valuable case studies of US military aircraft and 
missile sales  to other countries: F-16s to Belgium, the Netherlands,  Denmark,  
Norway, and Greece; Patriot missiles to West Germany and the Netherlands; 
AWACS aircraft to the UK and France; and F-18s to Canada, Australia, and Spain. 
When the DPA expired in October 1990, so did the reporting requirement.  
Several interludes of revival and expiration followed with the Act finally revised on 
October 29, 1992, retroactive to March 1, 1992.  While factors other than offsets 
were apparently more important  elements in explaining this strange sequence of 
actions, the return of the DPA also restored the offset-reporting requirement—but 
with some interesting differences.  Henceforth, the Secretary of Commerce was to 
be responsible for the preparation of the reports and was designated to function as 
the Executive Agent of the President in administering the requirements of Section 
309 of the DPA.  It should be noted that the Office of Management and Budget was 
removed from membership in the interagency committee as well as from its former 
leadership role in the work of the committee.  The prevailing opinion at the time saw 
this change as a reflection of the ire of some Congressional critics at the former 
committee’s reports, which had concluded that the impact of offsets on the US 
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provided a fairly sophisticated analysis of proposed Congressional protectionist 
actions.27   
Findings: The most recent publication in the series, Offsets in Defense Trade, 
bears the date of December 2007 and contains data current through 2006.  This 
document (pp. iv-v, 2-1 to 2-7, 2-9, 2-11, 2-13, 4-5 to 4-7, 4-9 to 4-10, 5-17) is the 
source for the data below, unless otherwise indicated.   In examining offset data, it is 
necessary to distinguish between two different concepts: (a) the number and value 
of new offset agreements between the US defense sector and foreign governments, 
growing out of a US defense-related export sale; and (b) actual transactions which 
execute the terms of pre-existing offset agreements. 
Twelve prime US defense contractors reported that they entered into 44 new 
offset agreements with 20 countries in 2006.  The number of such agreements and 
their estimated value were higher than in 2005, the year with the minimum number 
of agreements over the 1993-2006 period.  The 2006 value of such offsets equaled 
$3.4 billion out of a defense export value base of $4.8 billion, or 70.9%.  Some 
interesting differences emerge when the figures are disaggregated by geographic 
region.  European nations received an average of 85.5% of contract value of 
defense exports as offsets.  The non-European states averaged offset requirements 
of 42.3%, a significant decline from their 93.2% in 2004. 
The December 2007 Offset Report presents comparable figures for the 1993-
2006 period.  Over this 14-year interval, US firms entered into 582 offset agreements 
with 42 countries, valued at $60.0 billion, or 71.2% of the export contract sales value 
of $84.3 billion.  Aerospace defense system sales accounted for slightly over 4/5 of 
those total export contracts.  During this longer period, European states represented 
65.9% of the total value of offset agreements, but this represented only 48.0% of the 
value of related export contracts.  The size of the European offset demands 
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averaged 97.7% of export contract values during the 1993-2006 period.  Offset 
agreements valued at 100% or more of contract value accounted for 74.4% of 
European agreements (by number) during that period.  These percentages peaked 
at 153.3% in 2003.  In 2006, the European average increased to 85.5% from 2005’s 
83.7%.  The lowest European average was 63.9% (of export contract value) in 2004. 
The offset average for non-European states was 46.7% of contract value over 
the 1993-2006 period.  In general, Middle Eastern and Asian countries demanded 
lower offset levels than did the Europeans.  Of the 269 offset agreements with non-
European countries, 68.4% required offset percentages of 50% or less.  Only 31.6% 
demanded percentages greater than 50%, and just 10 of the non-European offset 
agreements provided for offset requirements of over 100%. 
During the 14-year period, Austria led all other countries, with offset 
percentages equal to 172.2% of the value of defense exports.  The next largest five 
countries and their percentages were Poland (167.7%), the Netherlands (117.3%), 
South Africa (116.0%), Greece (114.2%),  and Sweden (103.9%).  
The authors of the Commerce Department report also calculated a moving 
weighted average to smooth out yearly fluctuations in both defense sales and 
offsets.  The weighted world trend of offset percentage values rose from 49.3% to 
102.9% between 1993 and 2005, and then decreased to 76.7% in 2004-2006.  
During that brief period, the European figure rose from 87.1% to 133.9%, but then 
fell to 81.2% from 2004 to 2006.  The required percentage for the rest of the world 
increased from 27.6% to 73% over the full 14-year period.  
As noted above, another important part of the offset phenomenon consists of 
transactions initiated to satisfy obligations in furtherance of the terms of earlier offset 
agreements.  US companies reported the total value of such offset transactions in 
2006 at $4.7 billion.  Indirect offset transactions constituted 63.6% of that figure, 
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From 1993-2006, US companies reported a total of 8,660 offset transactions 
covering 45 countries.  The total value of such transactions equaled $42.0 billion—of 
which indirect offsets accounted for 59.5%, while direct offsets constituted 39.6%.  
(The tiny unaccounted balance represented offsets of unspecified types.)  The 
majority of offset transactions (77.4%) during this span of time were found in the 
categories of Purchases, Subcontracts, and Technology Transfers.  Their respective 
shares of the total category were 38.2%, 22.2%, and 16.5%. 
With respect to industrial sectors, the majority of offset transactions fell into a 
small number of major industries involved in defense production.  The largest group 
by far was Transportation Equipment (SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) 37) 
which accounted for 53.2% of the total value of offset transactions in the 1993-2006 
period.  Second was the Electronics/Electrical sector (SIC 36), representing only 
12.9% of total value. 
Longer-term Changes: Over the past thirty-plus years, many changes have 
occurred in the use of offsets in defense trade.  Such variables as the magnitude 
and value of offset demands, the relative importance of direct versus indirect offsets, 
the use of brokers to facilitate the indirect variety, the length of the period allowed in 
which to complete offset requirements, and the methods of enforcement have all 
shifted.  
The comparison period may be lengthened by utilizing data for the bulk of the 
1980s and the pre-1980 years from a document in the earlier reporting series 
assembled under the auspices of the Office of Management and Budget (US OMB, 
1990, April 16).   The data may not be completely comparable with the later series, 
but it may still be useful in suggesting broad changes.  This document reports “value 
of implementation” in millions of current dollars.  For the pre-1980 years, $312.1 
million was recorded, in contrast with $10,786.0 million in the 1980-1987 period (US 
OMB1990, April 16, p. 137).  Data classified as “actual value of transactions” in the 
December 2007 report of the current series was $42.0 billion for the 1993-2006 
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30.9%, and 39.6%, while indirect offsets registered 69.9%, 61.4%, and 59.7%, 
respectively. In any single period, the percentages do not equal 100% due to the 
inclusion of offsets unspecified by type.  It appears that offset demanders’ 
preference for economic activity closely related to the product of the transaction has 
gradually been realized, while prime contractors’ desire to protect the original 
production layout has been slowly sacrificed.  
In the past, brokers often were utilized to assist major defense contractors 
convert physical quantities of items acquired under indirect offset contracts into 
cash.  Typically, brokers’ fees were considered relatively small and saved defense 
industrial firms from determining how to dispose of items as diverse as hams and 
tourist trips.  Commodity brokers, financial departments of banks, and specialized 
trading companies were utilized for such tasks. 
In more recent years, a new type of broker has appeared—one that 
specializes in commercializing new technologies developed in university or 
independent research laboratories.  Typically, such organizations are staffed with 
highly qualified scientists and engineers with little talent for marketing their 
discoveries.  The new generation of brokers, often staffed with technically oriented 
personnel, concentrates on bringing such developments to the attention of major 
defense firms with significant technology transfer obligations to foreign governments.  
Such obligations often focus on environmental and/or health improvements.  For a 
fee, such brokers offer to act as matchmakers, as it were—bringing new and 
promising technology forward for the principal contractor to offer in furtherance of 
meeting such responsibilities.  At the moment, we are unaware of reliable data to 
quantify such functions. 
Another consideration is the length of the time period over which the offset 
commitments may be fulfilled.  The longer the period, the more difficult it is to 
attribute subsequent purchases by the prime contractor to the offset requirements.  
During the 1980-1987 time interval, the average term was 11 years in offset deals 
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been declining as foreign demanders of offsets have become more sophisticated 
and more exacting.  Thus, in the 1993-2006 timeframe, the average period had 
fallen to just below 7 years (Offsets in Defense Trade, December 2007, pp. 4-7).  
The length of the period appears to have stabilized at this level in more recent years.  
Other considerations appear to have played a role, particularly the phenomenon of 
offset credit banking (under which the principal contractor with unexpired offset 
credits may, as it were, bank them for future use—at least for some specified period 
of time).   
Also of interest is the method of enforcement of offset terms.  During the 
earlier 1980-1987 period, a commitment to “best efforts” was reported in some 68% 
of cases studied, while the remaining 32% specified “liquidated damages” or some 
other form of financial penalty for failure to meet contractual obligations (US OMB, 
1990, April 16, p. 134).  Thus, two thirds of the cases relied upon a figurative 
handshake to ensure that contract terms would be met.  By 1993-1997, a “best 
efforts” commitment had dropped to about 50%, and while such information is no 
longer reported in the current annual reports series, an educated guess by a 
Commerce Department official put the figure at no more than 33%.  Thus, it would 
appear again that offset demanders have become less willing to tolerate an informal 
and undemanding approach to enforcement of contract terms.  
3. A Look Ahead: Offsets or Production Consortia? 
Any effort to evaluate the effect of offsets on both receivers and givers must 
begin by recognizing the complexities inherent in the phenomenon.  As noted above, 
countries demanding offsets differ widely in their goals and in the relative success or 
failure of their attempts.  There has been a shortage of objective and careful work in 
the area.  The attempt to lump together such a diverse group of policies resembles 
the famous legend of several blind men attempting to describe an elephant after 
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The foregoing sections have presented several theoretical and real-world 
considerations, each of which suggests the need for caution before endorsing 
wholeheartedly the view of offsets as trade diverting and welfare reducing.  A high-
ranking executive of a major US aerospace firm recently observed, “Many supplier 
relationships of today are built on offset relationships of some years ago.  We have 
now learned how to work together without offsets.”28  What is particularly intriguing 
here is that three decades ago, a Swiss executive described a principal goal of his 
country’s offset policy as designed to bring to the attention of foreign (American) 
industrialists the high quality of Swiss industry.29  
This anecdote provides some support for a point made in the conclusions of a 
paper on offsets published some years ago:  
If their principal effect is to pressure the principal design contractor to broaden 
its horizons in the search for subcontractors, offsets may actually lead to a 
more efficient pattern of production linkages and a welfare-enhancing 
arrangement.  Here, an alliance between liberal trade theorists and anti-offset 
interests may be perverse. (Udis & Maskus, 1991, p. 163) 
The authors of the above paper concluded that while some offsets may be 
efficiency and welfare enhancing, others may contribute to structural inefficiencies in 
the global economy.  Thus, they recommended a serious attempt to identify criteria 
to differentiate between the two prior to any effort at international control.  That need 
still exists. 
4. Beyond Offsets? 
Over the years, the heavy attention paid to offsets has tended to veil the fact 
that offsets, per se, are not a stand-alone phenomenon, but rather represent a stage 
in the evolving dynamic of international trade in defense items.  The post World War 
II period began with the transfer by the US military of surplus armaments to newly 
                                            
28 Source is personal interview conducted with a condition of anonymity in 1992.   
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liberated countries.  Gradually, this evolved into widespread production under 
license of American weapons and aircraft with liberal terms to ease the “dollar 
shortage” of the period.  In states with a historic aircraft tradition, indigenous design 
and production began to appear, followed in the 1970s by a growing use of offset 
programs. 
While little attention has been paid to the principal reasons for success or 
failure of such programs, it is clear that in many cases, significant technological 
progress was acquired by the industries of participating buyer states.  For example, 
in a paper which is generally critical of the offset experience of Spanish industry in 
the F-18 offset program, Molas-Gallart notes that “there were, in fact, cases of 
Spanish firms building areas of expertise which they would use on new programs 
and would become part of their technological portfolio.”  He cites one of the best-
known cases as that of the Spanish electronics firm CESELSA in its work on 
simulators which has contributed to its work in [other] international programs and the 
development of its own systems (Molas-Gallart, 2006, p. 97).  It should also be 
noted that the Spanish aerospace firm CASA currently is a junior partner in the 
European aerospace conglomerate EADS, which produces both military aircraft (the 
European Fighter Aircraft known as Typhoon) and civilian passenger aircraft (the 
Airbus family).  Some years ago in private interviews, Spanish government officials 
expressed such developments as goals of CASA’s participation in the F-18 Hornet 
program. 
In fact, the evolution of Spanish offset policy provides a microcosmic example 
of what may be happening more generally in the offset arena.30  When the Spanish 
offset agreement was negotiated in the early 1980s, indirect offsets were much more 
important than the direct variety.  This resulted in a large number of companies 
involved in generally small offset activities.  A significant effort was required to 
                                            
30 The details following for the Spanish F-18 offset program and its impact on the evolution of Spain’s 
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administer these operations, as McDonnell Douglas submitted these projects for 
approval individually and each had to be approved by the Spanish Offset 
Management Office.  Soon, the Office was inundated with paperwork.  During the 
ten-year program, thousands of projects and project applications were processed.  
The relatively small share of defense-related offsets (28% of total program value) 
was a disappointment, as was the even smaller share representing technology 
transfer. 
Following the expiration of the formal contract period, a three-year “grace 
period” was negotiated; this contained substantial changes reflecting the 
experiences of the first decade.  In retrospect, from the Spanish perspective, the 
original program was structured in a way that generated high overhead and 
transaction costs due to an excessive number of projects with inadequate strategic 
focus.  The emphasis shifted dramatically from indirect to direct offsets closely 
associated with the F-18 aircraft.  The nature of these offsets had to be agreed upon 
in advance, so that the Spanish were no longer simply reacting to suggestions 
initiated by McDonnell Douglas. 
In the early years of the program, Spanish industry had only a limited 
capability to handle direct work on the aircraft.  The Spanish defense industry was 
fragmented, technologically weak, and largely state-owned.  The principal actors 
were each associated with one of the three armed forces: CASA (Construcciones 
Aeronáuticas, S. A.); BAZAN for the Navy; and ENSB (Empresa Nacional Santa 
Bárbara), which produced land armaments for the Army.  To correct this situation, 
the Spanish Government began to incorporate local industry into defense research 
activities.  From the mid-1980s to 1991, government support of defense R&D had 
climbed from insignificant levels to nearly 30% of total Spanish government R&D 
outlays. 
These efforts had repercussions beyond the F-18 program and served to 
bring the capability of the Spanish industrial base closer to the level of its neighbors.  
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production programs—including the European Fighter Aircraft (Typhoon) project, 
which by the early 1990s was absorbing more than 3/5 of total Spanish defense 
R&D.  It should be noted that the companies receiving the bulk of this investment 
were largely those that had been most involved in the F-18 direct offset activities. 
Thus, Spanish defense acquisition programs had shifted from classical offsets 
to multinational collaboration, which gave the Spanish partner a voice in system 
configuration.  An interesting example is provided by Spain’s purchase of eight 
Harriers and updating of twelve AV-8B Harriers in the early 1990s.  The work of 
developing a new Harrier variant was organized as a joint program with the US, Italy 
and UK.  Though a step up from the role of “buyer with offsets,” there was some 
concern that Spain might find itself a junior partner providing unsophisticated parts 
for a larger, integrated European defense market. 
It was hoped that the Spanish defense industrial base could be strengthened 
through a program of foreign direct investment.  This would not be completely new, 
as US and French firms had acquired minority holdings in state-owned defense 
companies during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  However, these activities were 
usually tied to specific procurements—which, at their conclusion and in the absence 
of follow-up orders, tended to wither away. 
There was particular concern for the major Spanish prime contractors (CASA, 
ENSB, and BAZAN, now known as IZAR).  What was sought was an ongoing 
partnership with established foreign firms which would ease Spanish producers into 
an international supply chain.  A series of deals with foreign firms eventually saw 
CASA enter the new European consortium EADS.   
After a series of efforts to attract foreign direct investment into ENSB, in an 
unexpected move, the company was sold to General Dynamics of the US in the 
spring of 2000.  Although Kraus-Maffei (KM) of Germany had been successful in 
selling its Leopard tanks to Spain (which were being produced in ENSB facilities), 
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required the establishment of a “Chinese Wall” to protect the confidentiality of KM 
technology and to prevent it from falling into the hands of its major competitor, GD.31  
The Spanish Government will also have to determine what its role will be in 
providing a continuous stream of orders necessary to retain the interest of its foreign 
partners. 
5. Offsets vs. Industrial Participation 
The wording of this subsection title suggests that the structure of the F-35 
JSF program may point the direction of future international collaboration.  Respected 
defense economists have examined the question and given somewhat varying 
answers.  Its theoretical emphasis on work assignment based on quality rather than 
politically attractive work-share schemes has naturally appealed to those trained to 
economize in the use of scarce resources and who view waste as close to sinful.   
Two British economists have examined the issue.  Keith Hartley sees the JSF 
as providing a model for future multinational collaboration, which would be desirable 
if it can be attained (Hartley, 2004, pp. 133-134).  Ron Matthews identifies offset 
policies which might enhance technological development but doubts their likelihood 
of adoption.  He concludes, “This is an ambitious agenda, and hanging on the 
presumption that offsets are here to stay.  History has shown this is not to be the 
case” (Matthews, 2004, p. 100).  This would appear to be a rather unequivocal 
prediction of the demise of offsets.  In a later paper, Matthews describes 
collaborative projects (like the Typhoon) and consortia ventures (like the JSF) as 
demonstrating “the twin attraction of member countries enjoying [lower] R&D costs 
and higher economies of scale from the unification of markets.  The lowest cost-
acquisition option is arguably the global consortia model.” (Matthews, 2006, pp. 82-
83)  He goes on to note: 
                                            
31 This may well be a difficult task, similar to that faced by Lockheed Martin in producing two new 
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However, although this model carries the benefits of a more refined 
international division of labour, including lower cost and enhanced product 
quality, the downside is the erosion of defence-industrial sovereignty caused 
by increased dependence on offshore vendors.  The question, however, is 
whether this loss of defence-industrial sovereignty any longer matters?  
Further (transformational) warfare is expected to be a quick and decisive 
exercise.  It will incorporate a coalition doctrinal approach,  justifying further 
cooperation in the development of weapons systems as self-reliance 
becomes less and less an affordable option. (Matthews, 2006, also pp. 82-83)  
Matthews’ perceptive paper also recognizes that the “global consortia model, 
requiring that workshare be based on the competitiveness of member countries’ 
national industries” has meant that the majority of work has been captured by highly 
efficient US and UK defence contractors, leaving minimal work for smaller country 
participants” (p. 86).  Only time will tell whether this will be an accurate picture of, 
say, the JSF program.  However, it appears to support an earlier designation of the 
modern international defense marketplace as resembling a “hub and spoke” model 
in which:  
A few large first-tier firms operating at the centre with lines of outsourced 
production extending out to second-tier states on the periphery.  First-tier 
players would serve as “centres of excellence,” providing armaments 
production with its critical design, development, and systems-integration 
inputs, along with the production of more advanced subsystems, such as 
engines, wings, sensors, information systems, and other electronics.  
Second-tier arms producers would mainly be responsible for supplying niche 
systems or low-tech items, such as structural components.  Final assembly 
could take place in either country, depending on the end-user.  Such 
cooperative arrangements could be highly formalised, involving a second-tier 
firm working for only one first-tier producer, presumably as a wholly- or 
partially-owned subsidiary.  It is, however, likely that this process would entail 
second-tier enterprises being engaged in subcontracts or joint venture 
partnerships with several first-tier firms at the same time.  As such, future 
armaments production could more closely resemble the modern concept of 
the “virtual corporation”—independent firms coming together on an as-needed 
basis in order to design and/or develop and/or manufacture a product, only on 
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C. Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), as a branch of economics, arose as part 
of the systematic study of firm “boundaries.”  More specifically, Coase’s seminal 
article specifically posed the question as to why firms make products (or 
components) within their enterprise boundaries instead of purchasing them 
(seemingly more cheaply) from other businesses who specialize in making those 
products (Coase, 1937).  The basic insights from Coase’s (and succeeding inquiries) 
are (a) that the market itself is not a frictionless, costless medium, and (b) that 
choosing to buy rather than make some item may well involve forming a relationship 
rather than simply making a purchase (Franck and Melese, 2005).  Research along 
these lines has also revealed that managing such relationships is, likewise, not 
costless. 
The TCE School holds that a careful analysis of alternatives (make vs. buy) 
would consider more than just the production costs.  Choosing, for example, to 
produce “widgets” within the the firm involves management time and attention to 
ensure that widgets are produced efficiently, and in ways that effectively support the 
rest of the firm.  These are generally called “agency” costs (Besanko, et. al., 2000). 
Likewise, buying the widgets from a firm that specializes in producing widgets 
involves the (transaction) costs of operating in the marketplace and managing any 
business-to-business relationships formed.  Thus, in general, firms should buy the 
widgets, or “outsource” them according to a fundamental rule. If  
(Internal Production + Agency) Costs > (Outsourced Production + Transaction) Costs, 
then widgets should be purchased from some other firm and not produced in-
house (Frank & Melese, 2005; Franck, 2004). 
There is good reason to believe that for many types of widgets, internal 
production costs exceed outsourced production costs.  Firms that specialize in 
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produce as efficiently as possible (i.e., producing today’s widget orders at least 
cost).  Furthermore, in a competitive market, those firms are also motivated to find 
ways of reducing the cost of their widget production—to gain a competitive 
advantage over rivals that leads to profits.  Moreover, in a competitive market, the 
results of such innovations are eventually passed to buyers in the form of lower 
prices (Franck, 2004).  Furthermore, widget-specializing firms in competitive markets 
tend toward full exploitation of economies of scale.  Since they produce widgets 
pretty much continuously, they can also take full advantage of economies available 
from extended serial production (learning by doing) (Besanko, et. al., 2000; Franck, 
2004). 
Hence, there is an apparently strong case for outsourcing.  And in many 
cases, it’s compelling.  For example, paper clips are readily available in local 
markets.  Their purchase involves a one-time exchange (or a series of one-time 
exchanges); there is no need to form a relationship with another firm.  Hence, the 
transaction cost associated with paper clips is very low, relative to the cost of making 
needed paper clips in-house.  And, as one would expect, few (if any) commercial 
enterprises make paper clips just for their own use. 
There are also cases in which the decision to outsource involves some sort of 
relationship with another firm.  In order to fully achieve the benefits of outsourcing, it 
might well be necessary for the two firms to alter their portfolio of assets in order to 
fully realize the benefits of their relationship.  That is, the outsourcing relationship 
may well create a significant, and shared, benefit based on continued partnership.  
In such cases, the outsourcing relationship changes significantly—from the widget-
making firm being simply the winning bidder to becoming a close partner with its 
buyer.  The TCE literature calls this the fundamental transformation; the relationship 
with one’s widget supplier changes from being a one-time, arms’-length market 
exchange to a fully involved partnership (Besanko, et. al, 2000). 
The danger for both firms is that either party, or both, may choose to dispute 
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category of “opportunistic behavior” (Williams, 1996).  The quest for larger shares 
may also involve a “holdup,” a threat to dissolve the (mutually beneficial) relationship 
without a significant renegotiation of its terms (to the advantage of one partner and 
at the expense of the other) (Besanko, et. al., 2000). 
Firms entering into such partnerships are, of course, aware of such dangers 
and can take measures to prevent or mitigate them.  One obvious measure to 
prevent bad behavior on the part of one’s partners is to insist on a well-structured 
contract—which should prevent expected problems and provide a governance 
mechanism to deal with unexpected problems (Besanko, et al., 2000; Franck, 2004).  
However, it’s impossible to adequately deal with all future contingencies (just as it’s 
impossible to fully predict the future); this is called “bounded rationality” in the TCE 
literature (Williamson, 1996).  Other measures include well-chosen schemes of 
asset ownership and maintenance of a standby widget production capability in-
house.  Such provisions are said to fall into the category of “tapered integration” 
(Franck and Melese, 2005). 
The problem, of course, is that the measures discussed above (and others) 
all come at a cost.  Writing, negotiating, renegotiating and enforcing contracts can 
involve significant costs.  Likewise, tapered integration involves second-best 
production arrangements that impose costs by their inefficiencies.  Thus, transaction 
costs may well overwhelm the production cost savings, plus the management 
(agency) costs associated with in-house production. 
TCE research has identified a number of indicators of expected transaction 
costs in outsourcing relationships.  Prominent on that list are the following: 
 Asset Specificity, 
 Complexity of Project, 
 Length of Relationship, 
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 Time Sensitivity, and 
 Operational Significance. (Powell, 2002; Franck, 1994, pp. 38-39) 
As indicated above, Asset Specificity involves making investments in the 
outsourcing relationship, when the value of the assets acquired is much less in other 
contexts.  Complex outsourcing relationships are more likely to have only a few 
qualified suppliers available (perhaps only one); this, of course, limits competition— 
the buyer’s main source of leverage.  Long-term relationships entail long-term 
planning and probably long-term contractual arrangements.  With the longer time 
horizon comes greater difficulty in foreseeing potential problems and (especially) 
opportunities for opportunistic behavior.  Frequency of orders for goods and services 
may well convey efficiencies from learning by doing for the incumbent contractor.  
This, in turn, means a significant disadvantage for potential competitors—
strengthening the incumbent’s position and providing added scope for opportunistic 
behavior or a holdup.  Finally, some outsourced goods and services involve severe 
consequences if not delivered (or performed) in a timely manner.  That is, the 
frequency of crisis situations with a high degree of operational significance and time 
sensitivity increases the supplier’s bargaining position and, accordingly, increases 
scope for opportunistic behavior.  And, of course, increased scope for opportunistic 
behavior on the part of the supplier increases the buyer’s risk. 
A thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) by Powell (2002) offers a 
simple method to assess these risks—through a stoplight scheme.  If, for example, 
the outsourcing relationship involves a high degree of asset specificity, then there is 
increased risk for the buyer (and for the seller as well).  This aspect of the program 
would rate a “red light” assessment—identifying an area for risk reduction efforts (to 
include producing in-house). 
1. TCE Considerations for National Military Establishments 
As indicated above, nations, for good reason, regard defense production 
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therefore, to regard the nation and its defense industries as being merged for 
purposes of national policy.   
In that context, the decision to purchase arms from abroad is a political 
analog to the decision of commercial businesses to outsource production of goods 
or services.  While outsourcing can be quite attractive in terms of production cost, 
there are the risks associated with opportunistic behavior on the part of suppliers.   
The rise of the nation state in the Seventeenth Century has been closely 
linked to a “military revolution” associated with the Artillery and Fortress RMAs 
(Krepinevich, 1994).  One of the principal outcomes of the revolution was greatly 
increased costs of waging war—both offensively and defensively.  Accordingly, the 
rise of European great powers was, in significant part, an attempt to realize 
economies of scale in military affairs (Parker, 1989; Rogers, 1989; Krepinevich, 
1994).  That is, one of the principal reasons for nation-states is their usefulness as 
military enterprises—both as forces and as means of production.  Thus, the rise of 
the nations was (in a very real sense) a merger and acquisition campaign to achieve 
effective vertical integration of the warfighting enterprise. 
The contemporary tension is that nations are no longer well-integrated military 
enterprises.  A number of trends—including globalization and the changing nature of 
economics of scale in military production (discussed above)—have put this aspect of 
sovereignty under considerable strain.32   
Because states are no longer fully integrated (autonomous) defense 
production enterprises, the issue of relationships with supplier nations has become: 
(a) an increasingly important security policy issue, and (b) a source of tension in the 
global defense marketplace.  This perspective will be treated in greater detail when 
                                            
32 If we take this line of thought to a natural (if extreme) conclusion, we can observe the irony of states 
becoming smaller on average over the past half century, while the size of state needed to achieve 
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considering the UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy below (UK Ministry of Defence, 
2005). 
D. Corporate Strategy Models 
Two standard models of corporate strategy come from Porter (1980), and 
Brandenberger and Nalebuff (1996).33  Porter’s model is called “Five Forces;” 
Brandenberger’s is “co-opetition.”  A graphical representation of the Five Forces 
model appears in Figure 1 below.  The basic picture is one of a (presumably 
profitable) firm besieged by a number of actors who wish to take away some (or all) 
of those profits.  They are categorized as current industry rivals, potential entrants 
(aspiring rivals), buyers (or customers), suppliers, and firms in related industries.  
The Five Forces Model is offered as a means of better understanding that firm’s 
situation. 
In Porter’s scheme, the threat from current rivals is most acute with a (a) large 
number of sellers in a (b) declining market in which (c) firms have overcapacity but 
face (d) exit barriers.  Barriers to entry protect against aspiring competitors (potential 
entrants).  They typically exist in the form of: (a) economies of scale, (b) brand 
loyalties, (c) access to inputs, technology and local knowledge, and (d) government 
protection of incumbents.   
 
                                            
33 Also, these sorts of analyses are a standard part of managerial economics.  An excellent 


















Figure 1.  Porter’s Five Forces Model 
(Porter, 1980, p. 4; Besanko, et. al, 2000, p. 361) 
The availability and closeness of substitutes and complements also affects 
firm profits.  For example, improvement in quality or lower price of a close substitute 
could induce the firm’s customers to switch to the alternative product and 
significantly lower its profits.34  Likewise, an improvement in quality or lower price of 
a complement could induce customers to buy more of that complement and, with it, 
more of our firm’s product—thus increasing profits.35  Suppliers (including unions) 
with considerable market power could substantially increase prices of inputs, and 
lower profits.  Similarly, buyers with significant market power can drive hard bargains 
for their supplying firms.  (Sovereign entities, like governments buying defense 
                                            
34 Thus, for example, we would expect Coca Cola to pay careful attention to (say) fruit juices 
(substitutes) on the market, as well as Pepsi Cola (an industry competitor in Porter’s scheme). 
35 However, Porter’s perspective is much more involved with threats to profits than with profit 
improvers.  Porter’s version of Figure 1 does not include “complements” in its basic diagram; 
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equipment, have—by definition—considerable power in dealing with defense 
industrial firms.) 
Within Porter’s Five Forces scheme, there are three basic strategies to 
mitigate or avoid threats to profits.  First is to develop cost or performance 
advantages (or both).  The second strategy is to find and enter a new market niche 
in which there are less severe threats.  The third is changing the Five Forces to 
decrease the threats. 
The “Co-opetition,” or Value Net, approach is not really a competing theory to 
the Five Forces.  It is best regarded as a shift in emphasis from the Five Forces 
framework.  Fundamentally, Brandenberger and Nalebuff (1996) offer a view of a 
business environment that emphasizes opportunities as well as threats.  The basic 
“Value Net” perspective is depicted in Figure 2.   
The Value Net (or Co-opetition) view emphasizes opportunities as well as 
threats.  The basic idea, among others, is that firms can find opportunities as well as 
threats.  There are potential allies as well as competitors to be found in the 
environment.  While some products pose a threat to profits (as substitutes), others 













Figure 2. The Co-opetition Model (Value Net ) 
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IV. Three “Cases”: Joint Strike Fighter, UK 
Defence Industrial Strategy, and KC-30 Proposal 
We have chosen to exercise our models and assess their usefulness in 
explaining three ongoing (and interesting) cases, which feature extensive 
involvement of both governments and major defense industrial firms on both sides of 
the North Atlantic.  For each case, we provide first an interpretative narrative of 
relevant events.  We then offer explanations for the observed events using the 
models developed in Section III above.  Our cases are the Joint Strike Fighter (A), 
the UK Defence Industrial Strategy (B), and the KC-30 proposal from EADS and 
Northrop-Grumman (C). 
A. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (Lightning II) 
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is intended not only for operation by multiple 
military services, but also by many partner nations.  This case is interesting for a 
number of reasons, including its antecedents and history, project organization, and 
the responses by the many national and corporate participants.  It’s also interesting 
because of its potential effects on defense industries worldwide. 
1. History36  
The roots of the F-35 can be traced to efforts underway in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s by the US Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to develop a next-
generation strike aircraft.  The US Navy's work on the stealth A-12 Avenger II was 
cancelled in 1991 in favor of a successor project (A/F-X) to develop a new 
Fighter/Attack aircraft.  Concurrently, the US Air Force was seeking a next-
generation strike aircraft to replace the F-16, which was designated the Multi-Role 
Fighter (MRF).  Likewise, the US Marine Corps was also searching for a modern 
Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft to replace its AV-8B Harrier II.  
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As it turned out, the British Royal Navy was thinking along the same lines as it 
considered retiring its Sea Harrier naval fighter aircraft.  The two allied services 
joined their efforts and collaborated in the late 1980s on STOVL research.  The US 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) also initiated a series of 
studies of various STOVL concepts.  As the US Marine Corps expanded its goal to 
also replace its conventional F/A-18 Hornet aircraft, DARPA's efforts yielded the 
concept of an advanced STOVL fighter capable of conventional takeoff and landing.  
It was identified as the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter or "CALF." 
In September 1993, the Clinton Administration cancelled both the Navy A/F-X 
and the Air Force MRF projects.  However, the DoD was permitted to establish a 
research office to study what was called Joint Advanced Strike Technologies (JAST) 
for future development.  Shortly thereafter, the Congress required that DARPA's 
CALF research be merged with the JAST office.  Rapid progress followed toward 
building a next-generation strike fighter. 
The jointness goal was to be met by the development of three different 
variants of an aircraft with a common technological base.  Three versions of the 
aircraft were needed to meet a trinity of requirements: The USAF desired a 
conventional attack aircraft with stealth, advanced avionics, and low life cycle 
operating costs which could deliver reliability, good range, speed, and significant 
weapons load. 
The US Navy's operational needs were similar, but to meet the demands of 
carrier operations, its carrier version (CV) required larger, folding wings for low-
speed carrier approaches and sturdier landing gear, plus an arresting hook to 
accommodate carrier landings.  The US Marines and British Royal Navy desired a 
capable attack aircraft with advanced STOVL qualities to permit operations from 
forward battlefields, and smaller helicopter carriers and British "jump jet" operations 
off of carriers.  All variants were required to be capable of defending themselves and 
to provide protection of fleet assets against attack.  Performance had to be at least 
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from a conventional baseline aircraft, the F-35A (Conventional Takeoff and Landing 
or CTOL) priced at the USAF requirement, with incrementally higher prices to meet 
the carrier, the F-35C (CV), and the F-35B (STOVL) versions. 
The JAST program office released a request for proposals in March 1996.  
Shortly thereafter, the project name was changed to Joint Strike Fighter.  Three 
groups responded to the request: a McDonnell-Douglas-headed team joined by 
Northrop Grumman and British Aerospace (later absorbed into BAE Systems), a 
Boeing team, and a Lockheed Martin team.  Later in 1996, the concepts submitted 
by Lockheed Martin and Boeing were chosen as finalists, and both firms started 
work on a demonstration aircraft.  In October 2001, the X-35 of Lockheed Martin was 
declared the winning entry.  Apparently the race was close, but Lockheed Martin's 
design was viewed as the less risky alternative.  In addition, its lift-fan design for the 
STOVL model was judged most promising.  It also resembled a single-engine 
version of Lockheed Martin's F-22 Raptor, contoured for stealth. (Details of the 
competing models are available from Goebel, 2006, pp. 3-5).   
Advanced weapons concepts and affordability were guiding principles in JSF 
design.  All F-35 models share in common an integrated core processor that joins 
data from all the aircraft's sensors into a coordinated view of the battlefield.  Its 
sensors include an active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radar with a 
synthetic aperture radar mapping mode to yield a precise search and targeting 
capability superior to any now  found in US attack fighters.  Although not optimized 
for air-to-air combat, the JSF’s equipment includes an infrared search and track 
(IRST) system which would be useful in that mode.  Its air-to-ground attack features 
include an electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) with a forward-looking infrared 
imager (FLIR), a targeting laser, a laser spot tracker, and a CCD TV camera.  JSF 
software can analyze the information provided by these sensors using an automatic 
target recognition and classification (ATRC) system to identify specific targets.  A 
speech recognition system obviates the need for the pilot to manually operate 
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Despite such advances, a concern for limiting costs can be traced to other 
features of the aircraft.  Stealth was one area where design was not pushed to a limit 
to achieve maximum advantage.  Thus, while the JSF design used internal weapon 
bays and shaping contours to help reduce the aircraft's radar signature, it has not 
attained the stealth level of such existing aircraft as the F-22 or B-2.  Large 
munitions loads will have to utilize underwing storage pylons to supplement the 
capacity of the internal weapon bays—a further sacrifice of stealth.   
Jointness: The term "joint" in Joint Strike Fighter indicated that it was seen as 
a military platform which could meet important needs on a multiservice level 
(“General Dynamics F-111,” 2008).  Skeptics could point to the failure of the prior 
effort designed to meet joint service needs in the 1960s, the F-111 pressed by then 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.  However, advocates of the JSF saw it as 
much more likely to successfully meet such needs and to avoid the pitfalls which 
frustrated the prior effort.  A comparison of these two projects might prove helpful in 
weighing the JSF's prospects for success. 
The origins of the F-111 are found in the TFX program of the early 1960s, 
which sought to combine the Air Force requirement for a fighter bomber with deep 
strike interdiction capabilities, with the Navy’s need for a long-range carrier defense 
aircraft to replace the F-4 Phantom II and the F-8 Crusader.  The Air Force objective 
was to acquire a fast strike aircraft with the capability to approach a target at low 
altitude in order to deliver its weapons (including nuclear).  Air-to-air combat would 
be a very low priority for such an aircraft.  The Navy's needs were quite different.  It 
was seeking a long-range, tough interceptor to defend carrier task forces against 
enemy bombers armed with anti-ship missiles. 
Size and weight constraints imposed by carrier landing requirements posed a 
difficult problem for the design of a fleet air defense aircraft with superior loitering 
performance and load-carrying capacity.  Mutual inconsistencies were found to exist 
between airframes optimized for very high speed (with consequent high fuel 
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optimized for greater fuel efficiency (with heavy load capability over longer range 
with reduced combat performance). 
Designers saw variable geometry (swept wing design) as a possible route to 
an acceptable compromise.  The Navy was highly skeptical of this solution.  It had 
already tried variable geometry in its XF-6F Jaguar, which it subsequently 
abandoned in 1953.  The variable geometry technology available in the early 1960s 
seemed to bring significant problems—for example, higher cost and additional 
weight associated with the swing wing equipment, and limited ordnance carrying 
capacity imposed by the swept wing design.   
While designers attempted to meet the Navy's unique needs in the F-111B 
model, the solutions attempted were unsuccessful.  The case for the F-111B 
deteriorated during the Vietnam War when air combat indicated that the Navy still 
required a fighter with close-range air-to-air capability superior to the F-4 Phantom II 
then in use.  If anything, the F-111B appeared inferior to the F-4 for medium-altitude 
combat.  By late 1967, the Navy recommended the cancellation of the F-111B 
program, which occurred the following year. 
Interestingly, the entire effort was not a complete waste of resources as the F-
111B’s variable geometry design, TF-30 engines, Phoenix missiles, and radar were 
successfully utilized on its successor, the F-14 Tomcat.  The F-111 saw service in 
the US Air Force from 1967 through 1998, and entered service with the Royal 
Australian Air Force in 1973, where it has only recently been retired from operational 
service. 
While conceived as a multi-role fighter, the F-111 spent most of its 
operational life as a long-range attack aircraft, essentially armed with air-to-surface 
weaponry.  What logic suggests that the JSF will not suffer a similar fate?  One 
answer may be found in three developments: technical, operational, and 
bureaucratic.  There have been important technological advances since the early 
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materials that dramatically reduce aircraft weight.  Other developments include 
advances in aircraft engines, miniaturization, avionics, computers and weaponry.   
Also, several major firms working on the F-35 have also been involved in the 
development and production of the F-22, a top-of the-line air superiority fighter now 
entering service in the US Air Force.  There have apparently been several cases in 
which familiarity with the F-22 experience has benefited the F-35 project (Butler & 
Phillips, 2007, September 17, pp. 34-45).   
On the operational front, the US armed forces have greatly expanded their 
experience with and understanding of joint military operations.  The importance of 
such operations has filtered down into the programs of the major service academies 
and mid-career training.  Joint command experience now is required among officers 
aspiring to promotion to the higher ranks. 
Finally, the top levels of the DoD have indicated a lack of patience with knee-
jerk negative reactions to efforts to obtain economies resulting from unified 
approaches to military challenges.  The cancellations in 1993 of both the Navy's A/F-
X and the Air Force's MRF projects by the Clinton Administration, noted above, have 
not been forgotten.  Not surprisingly, the major problems encountered thus far in the 
JSF project have occurred in the F-35B, the STOVL version.  Early F-35B designs 
suffered from excessive weight.  The final solution to that problem required a smaller 
internal weapons bay than that found in other F-35 models, with a consequent 
substantial reduction in the weight of weapons carried.  Further weight reduction was 
attained by shortening the vertical tails with attendant uncertainties.  The resolution 
of other such problems will give a strong clue to the future success of the program. 
Organization: From early in the life of the project, the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) issued guidance that stressed that the program be designed to 
include international participation.  Given the longstanding interest in and prior 
experience with STOVL in the several Harrier models, it was a foregone conclusion 
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in the Concept Demonstration Phase were Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Canada and Italy.  Australia and Turkey joined the JSF team somewhat later as 
Level III partners in the current Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) 
Phase, which is expected to continue until 2012-2013 when the final Production, 
Sustainment and Follow-on Phase is initiated.37   
To fully understand the organization of the JSF project, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the Government-to-Government level at which the basic nature 
of each partner’s participation is specified, and the industrial side of the project 
which deals with production.  The governmental stage deals with the size of the 
country's financial contribution to the project (its investment), its degree of 
participation in the Joint Program Office, in aircraft design, and in broad overall 
operational details (such as logistics) to insure an efficient worldwide availability of 
spare parts and other requirements for sustainability of the fleet. 
Although a commitment to purchase aircraft was not formally required of the 
partners, the possibility of such sales certainly was an attractive prospect from the 
viewpoint of extending the length of the production run and enjoying the benefits of 
volume economies.  Standardization and interoperability in the air fleets of friendly 
and allied states offered the opportunity for efficiency in maintenance and logistics.38 
                                            
37 The bulk of the material presented in this section applies to the current SDD Phase, and much of it 
comes from Schreiber (2002, November, p. 164).  
38 A caveat is necessary here on the potential benefits of commonality.  Such commonality in design 
of aircraft of member countries will have to operate within the constraints imposed by the US National 
Disclosure Policy.  This potential problem was recognized early, and in mid-1999, the plans for 
proceeding in the SDD phase were approved by the DoD's Arms Transfer Policy Review Group.  This 
strategy was then coordinated with and approved by the Department of State.  In an effort to recruit 
the support of the Legislative Branch, key staff members of the House and Senate Foreign Relations 
Committees were also briefed before the SDD strategy was implemented.  It would appear that the 
managers of the program have taken steps to anticipate and deal with this issue.  However, some 
Lockheed Martin executives still feel that the effectiveness of these actions will only be determined 
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Potential market size for the JSF was seen to be substantial, approaching 
3000 aircraft—even without including possible third-country sales.  Early estimates 
included 1763 CTOL variants for the USAF, replacing F-16s and A-10s.  The US 
Marine Corps could absorb 609 STOVL models, replacing F/A-18 C/D Hornets and 
AV-8B Harrier IIs, while the Navy was contemplating 480 CV variants to replace FA-
18C/D Hornets.  The British Royal Navy and Air Force were considering a total of 
150 STOVL models to replace Harrier GR.7/9s. (It should be noted, however, that 
more recent estimates of these figures show a reduction of approximately 500 
aircraft.) Partner purchases are seen as approaching 600.  Project lifetime sales 
projections exceed 5000 aircraft. 
In the current System Development and Demonstration (SDD) Phase, three 
levels of participation were established for partner countries: Level 1 (full partner)—
Only the UK qualifies for this level with a contribution of $2 billion; Level II (associate 
partner)—Italy and the Netherlands; Level III (informed partner)—Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, and Turkey.  There also is an arrangement for other countries 
interested in acquiring JSF aircraft under FMS purchase programs to enter as 
Security Cooperation Participants.  Thus far, Israel and Singapore have joined under 
such terms.39  The number of national military officers which each member country 
may contribute to the integrated program office staff is keyed to the size of the 
nation’s financial contribution.  Currently, there are a total of 42 non-US officers 
serving in the Crystal City Joint Program Office.  Participation in the various 
Integrated Product Teams within the Program Office is expected to offer a greater 
role for influencing and understanding the development process. 
Calculation of participants’ return on investment also reflects their level of 
investment.  Normally, a non-recurring R&D cost recoupment charge is levied on the 
                                            
39 Both of these countries maintain small project offices in the Washington area.  Israel is now 
initiating JSF-contracted studies to better understand how a JSF aircraft can be modified to 
accommodate Israeli-designed C4I equipment, weaponry, and electronic warfare devices (Opall-
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purchase price for buyers of US military equipment.  This charge will be waived for 
Level I and II partners.  Level III partners will be able to credit the amount of their 
investment toward the applicable non-recurring R&D recoupment charge, while the 
balance may be waived on a case-by-case basis.  Partners will also share third-party 
levies on JSF aircraft built for FMS buyers.  This share will also be proportional to 
partners’ SDD investment. 
Such organizational arrangements bear an unmistakable similarity to the "pay 
to play" model increasingly found in commercial business transactions.  In the 
commercial form, the quid pro quo for an investment by suppliers in a project is 
usually a guaranteed order and a share of the profit earned on the product sold.40   
However, once attention shifts to the production side of the JSF project, this 
resemblance disappears.  Participation in the work of the program office is linked to 
the amount of the investment, as is waiver of recoupment of non-recurring costs and 
sharing in such costs paid by FMS purchasers.  However, participation in production 
is to be determined entirely by selection of the best supplier available.  Participation 
in the project assures partners of first opportunity to bid for work in the production 
phase, but there is no such thing as "guaranteed work share" related to investment.  
Attractiveness of the bids offered by partner industry is to be determined by the 
principal contractor and/or major subcontractors—in this case, Lockheed Martin, 
BAE, and Northrop Grumman on the airframe, and two engine consortia: one 
headed by Pratt and Whitney (P&W), and the other by General Electric (GE) and 
Rolls-Royce (RR).  
Offsets and the Joint Strike Fighter: The JSF program was designed to avoid 
offsets in the relations between the US and the eight partner states.  Theoretically, 
the partners have agreed that selection of participating producers in their countries 
would be the responsibility of the overall prime contractor, Lockheed Martin.  In 
                                            
40 For a description of pay-to-play in commercial aerospace, see Lunsford (2007, p. A-1).  In effect, 
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reality, there may be some room for negotiating whether this could be interpreted to 
mean that Lockheed would have the final word in choosing from a list provided by 
the partner state.  Lockheed has already complained that particular partners have 
urged the Joint Program Office to apply pressure for a favorable decision from 
Lockheed.  In any event, this issue is likely to remain a continuing problem and a 
subject for ongoing negotiation.  The heart of the problem is found in the expectation 
that participation in the F-35 supply chain will be restricted to firms that have a 
reputation for efficient work.  As Markowski and Hall have noted, “… There appears 
to be little scope for pump priming new or untested suppliers (in the project)” 
(Markowski and Hall, 2006, p. 19). 
Another likely source of difficulty looms in the future as non-member countries 
appear to negotiate purchases of the JSF under terms of the FMS program.  There 
is a high probability that they will demand direct offset work on their aircraft and the 
terms of such purchases will be negotiated by the US Department of Defense, not 
the Joint Program Office.  The potential award of such offsets clearly will not be 
welcomed by the original partner states that paid an initiation fee, as it were, to join 
the program.  Such a circumstance could also result in the replacement of efficient 
subcontractors in the supply chain by less efficient producers in the new buying 
state.   The possible waiver of the usual R&D recoupment charge to encourage such 
sales would also come at the expense of the partner states that were to share in 
such fees as a benefit of membership. 
All things considered, multinational consortia such as the JSF project are not 
likely to effect a clean break from offsets.  As Molas-Gallart has observed, 
This is not to say that offsets are a thing of the past.  Although their relative 
importance is diminishing, Spain has accumulated important experience in 
negotiating and managing offset agreements.  Because the Spanish 
administration feels it is learning to extract better offsets then before, the 
offset option will       remain an alternative to consider in almost any weapons 
transaction.  Yet with the preference given to other forms of “compensation” 
like international cooperation, or direct foreign investment in Spanish defence 
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transactions…In other words, offsets are here to stay as one element of the 
Spanish arms purchasing policy.  (Molas-Gallart, p. 317.] 
Spain is unlikely to be the only country to adopt such a policy. 
2. Partner Reactions  
Detailed interviews were conducted with officials of each of the partner states 
in late September and early October 2007.  These meetings were held with a 
guarantee of confidentiality and non-attribution.  All agreed that frank exchange of 
opinions would be to the advantage of all parties associated with the JSF project, 
and it is in that spirit that the following is presented.  These perspectives are 
presented below by country (in alphabetical order). 
Australia: A source of complaint for Australia was the perception that 
Lockheed Martin and BAE treat anything produced abroad as an example of an 
offset.  The Australians resent this as they “pay up front for anything they get.”  They 
feel that their talents and contributions are underappreciated.  It was pointed out that 
they have contributed to over 100 systems used by the US Navy and have 
contributed base technology for collaborative programs.  They see the US as 
reluctant to accept the need for help from abroad and feel that US industry can't do 
everything better than anyone else.   
Australia has flown F-111 aircraft for over a decade after the USAF took them 
out of service; this required that the aircraft be maintained largely by the users.  This 
included a major modification during which Australians maintain that International 
Trafic in Arms Regulations (ITARs)  on releasability delayed their work.  The 
Australian view was that such an interpretation is “madness,” since (among other 
things) it ignored the fact that such aircraft were available to protect and defend US 
interests in the region.  Australians see their homeland as an unsinkable aircraft 
carrier in the middle of the Indian Ocean.  They also operate the US F/A-18 aircraft, 
which helps keep a production base warm.  Informed people recognize that 
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they believe that such capabilities have already been demonstrated in the JSF 
project.   
The Australians consider the issue of operational sovereignty to be very 
important and feel that too much emphasis has been placed on "black box" security 
issues.  The point was emphasized that a qualified partner could work without 
opening a black box item if they were permitted to interface with it.  On the issue of 
the aerial refueling tanker, the point was made that Australia was flying Boeing 707s, 
which had been modified by Israel Aircraft Industries, and that it was satisfied with 
the result.  However, the view was offered that the US would be foolish not to split its 
current purchase of tankers on an equal basis, if for no other reason than to retain 
competition. 
In contrast with the situation in some other partner countries, there apparently 
is no leading defense industrial firm in Australia.  The most well-known domestic 
aerospace firm was Hawker de Havilland, which has since been purchased by 
Boeing.  In addition, the F/A-18.  There have been many changes in industrial 
structure in Australia during the past 20 years; these have resulted in the 
appearance of many new, small companies that may well find a niche in the market 
and a place in the JSF project.  
Canada: The meeting with the Canadians began with a short side discussion 
of offsets in which the traditional economic view of them as being trade diverting 
and, hence, welfare reducing was challenged.  The point was made that US 
domestic protectionism was unequivocally a source of trade distortion, which limited 
competition and gains from trade.   
The senior person present agreed with the view that the philosophy 
motivating the JSF organization represented the latest stage in the continuing 
evolution of transatlantic defense trade and industrial policy related to military 
procurement.  He contrasted the JSF approach with the traditional negotiation of 
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multinational defense acquisition projects.  The JSF project was not considered an 
offset program in any sense.  There is no mention of work share in any of the 
separate agreements negotiated with the US contractor.  He described it as a 
“hybrid”,with different levels of engagement between partner industry and Lockheed 
Martin and the other major subcontractors.  Canada developed a set of objectives 
which included matching JSF program requirements with its own industrial 
capabilities.  Part of the problem is that while Canada has a robust aerospace 
sector, Lockheed Martin appeared unaware of its capabilities.  Canada had 
developed extensive contacts with McDonnell Douglas (and later Boeing) on its F/A-
18 aircraft transaction and was well-integrated into that supply chain.   
Another problem grew out of the fact that Canada’s aerospace experience 
has been shaped by the production and sale of commercial aircraft.  Bombardier’s 
Canadair division had an established niche in the short- and intermediate-range 
commercial airliner industry.  Canadian capabilities also existed in the production of 
turbine engines and landing gear.  Since Lockheed Martin had almost no remaining 
representation in the commercial airliner business, it was not familiar with these 
Canadian competencies.  The situation is further complicated by the fact that 
Canadian commercial aircraft producers have little interest in focusing on a fifth-
generation fighter aircraft.  Their suppliers were also geared to commercial aircraft 
with different requirements and different business approaches.   
The Canadian government worked both to insure that Lockheed Martin and 
its major partner contractors obtained a full appreciation for Canadian capabilities as 
well as to target key sectors needing development and/or improvement to move 
Canada into a leadership role in at least some sectors of military aircraft.  Such 
goals were aided by the fact that the Canadians had entered the JSF project at a 
sufficiently early stage to participate fully in the concept, design, and development 
activities.  They anticipate that this will provide them an opportunity to participate in 
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Initially, Canadian officials expected that larger defense contractors (such as 
subsidiaries of US firms operating in Canada) would dominate in JSF activities in the 
country.  They were surprised when, on the contrary, small- and medium-sized firms 
with innovative talents but with little or no prior history of participation in the 
traditional military supplier base, found themselves with JSF contracts.  They see the 
JSF project as a massive development effort, probably the largest in trans-Atlantic 
military industry cooperation, and welcome the opportunity to participate.  If the 
expected sales volume is realized, Canada, despite its relatively small expected 
order of 80 aircraft, may be able to attain volume economies almost on a commercial 
level, which might have positive implications for the future.   
The Canadian government was seen as taking a proactive role in both 
making the primary contractors aware of Canadian capabilities and encouraging 
their domestic industry to participate in the project.  The respondents consider the 
underlying policy of seeking best-value sources wherever they are found within the 
partner community as both challenging and promising.  The work of the Joint 
Program Office was singled out as an impressive collective effort of great value.  An 
example was given of a Canadian Forces Colonel working with a British naval officer 
and reporting to an American general on matters of logistics.  The Canadians saw 
this approach, if successful, as a model for future development efforts. 
One source of concern was the US Competition and Contracting Act, which 
was seen as protectionist and a possible obstacle to the attainment of project 
cooperative goals.  The respondents are hopeful that the “mobilization exception” 
clause of the Act may offer a way around the problem. 
Denmark: The meeting began with a brief discussion of Danish experience 
with their F-16 Falcon buy.  It was described as "a huge success over its 30-plus-
year lifetime in every operational and commercial aspect.”  The multi-national 
partnership worked well, and the larger group purchase (plus the partners’ role in US 
Air Force and third-country sales) brought the cost per plane down dramatically.  It 
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have been “colossal. “ It was described as “one of the most successful buys of the 
century for Denmark.” 
On the operational side, a common aircraft among the partner states aided 
the formation and successes of a European Operational Wing during OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM.  While the partners didn’t fly or perform maintenance on 
one another's aircraft, software commonality was crucially important, and their prior 
joint training during Operation Red Flag had valuable operational spinoffs.  The 
Danes were also quite pleased with the results of their work in the F-16 midlife 
update.   
In response to a question about the strength of the Pan-Nordic idea 
emphasized by Sweden in its attempt to sell the Gripen, the respondents expressed 
skepticism.  They noted that since the end of World War II, it has been used as a 
political device to obtain cooperation and has never worked.  It was emphasized that 
the security policies of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway were more different than 
generally realized.  Sweden still shows signs of the non-alignment philosophy which 
dominated its foreign policy for so long, while Norway and Denmark have joined 
NATO to help its fellow members defend the region.   
Even after the end of the Cold War, there were signs that Sweden still 
demonstrated a “garrison state” mentality.  The Danes considered this an anomaly in 
an era of expeditionary warfare.  They have apparently helped Swedish forces to 
realize the importance of tactics such as close-air support.  The point was made that 
while Swedish forces are familiar with netcentric warfare, they are integrated only 
within their own forces, and are accordingly limited in their ability to engage in 
combined operations with friendly states.  It was implied that the traditional Swedish 
approach to warfare played a role in the design of the Gripen aircraft, which may 
limit its usefulness in the contemporary strategic environment. 
With respect to the future Danish needs, foreign suppliers will have to play a 
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expenditures.  There is little left of the Danish arms industry.  However, the F-16 
spinoff brought growth to relatively small Danish firms, and many of them developed 
excellent capabilities.  It was noted that the only non-US parts found in all F-16 
aircraft are Danish.   
The opportunity for Danish industry to participate in the development and 
production of the JSF appears to be a very attractive route for them to attain 
advanced technology.  This may be important in helping smooth Denmark’s 
transition from its traditional dependence on agriculture to modern industry.  This 
development is seen as important to prevent (or at least slow down) the emigration 
of young Danish talent to other countries. 
The competition for the new Danish aircraft appears to be among the JSF, the 
Typhoon Euro-fighter, and the Swedish Gripen.  The larger Danish firms which 
benefited from the F-16 project will support the JSF.  Sweden is offering significant 
industrial participation in the short run to make its offer politically attractive.  It has 
already ordered small satellites from the Danish electronics firm Terma.   
The Lockheed Martin offer is seen as highly competitive in terms of design 
and production.  Danish and Dutch firms will bid for high-value-added processes 
such as electronic systems, but political forces will press for more "metal bending 
factories to provide more jobs in the short run to keep workers and voters happy."  
Our respondents saw the competition as a contest between short-run and long-run 
values.  A Danish parliamentary commission has been established to define goals 
for the Danish military over the next decade.  Any decision regarding new military 
aircraft will probably not be made until that commission issues its reports.  
The Danes have no doubt that their air force will always be involved in 
coalition warfare and see an advantage in entering the US network.  They see the 
UK, Australia, Canada, and several of their neighbors as traditional allies and want 
to be certain that they can connect with this network when needed.  They see the 
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defense budget, which suggests limited prospects for supporting further 
improvements in the Gripen. 
In their judgment, the new generation of logistics will be much more cost 
effective, and the JSF appears closest to structuring a global logistics network to 
provide low maintenance costs and high availability.  On the other hand, they 
consider it very risky to enter the US defense market due to US content laws and 
technology transfer regulations.  They see the need to change US bureaucratic 
procedures as essential in furthering the effectiveness of coalition warfare. 
Italy: Traditionally in multinational military projects, the government-to-
government memoranda of understanding related the level of industrial participation 
to the size of the purchase.  This occasionally forced industrial work to be assigned 
to less efficient firms which lead, in turn, to increased costs.  It paid little heed to 
questions of efficiency.  The JSF project attempts to limit the governments’ role to 
the establishment of aircraft performance requirements, while turning the question of 
how such requirements will be accomplished to the industrial participants—in this 
case,  Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems.  The industrial goal, 
ostensibly, is best value for money.   
Our respondent compared this arrangement to the Tornado and Typhoon 
projects.  In the earlier Tornado project, major cost increases were incurred in order 
to meet the performance requirements.  The administrative structure was anything 
but efficient—with the three partners (each a sovereign state) at equal levels with no 
prime contractor to mediate differences.  This resulted in multiple assembly lines, 
multiple training systems, etc.  This contrasts to the JSF project where Lockheed 
Martin, by exception, may name a second source. 
In the Tornado and Typhoon projects, work level was assigned 
administratively, so there were few incentives to keep costs down.  In the JSF 
project, all partner firms must struggle to keep costs down.  They must understand 
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There are, however, political problems that still create difficulties.  The US 
ITAR rules on nondisclosure, for example, complicate an already difficult situation.  
Parliaments in partner states will resist financing projects which they see as 
strangling their domestic industries. 
US rules that appear to be doing this will be a source of strong conflict.  
Realistically, some bargaining will surely be necessary over partner access to what 
is viewed as necessary information.  Our respondent noted that Boeing has faced 
the same problem on the civil side, with much work on the 787 going abroad.  Some 
lobbying is probably underway on this issue. 
Multinational projects have also suffered from delays.  It took so long to 
develop aircraft in the past that they were obsolete when the services took delivery.  
The JSF program’s challenge is to prevent this condition from occurring while 
providing for long-term needs.  The strategic scenario was relatively stable during 
Tornado development, but the Typhoon faced a more volatile situation.  It was seen 
originally as an air superiority fighter, but halfway through its development the 
strategic situation had changed drastically.  The Typhoon partners were no longer 
dealing with a clearly defined potential enemy.  The Typhoon was not flexible; a 
major redesign was necessary, which caused further delays in its operational 
availability.   
Italy saw some important values in the JSF.  It was born as a fifth-generation 
fighter; it has new capabilities and is more deployable and flexible than its 
competitors.  While this aircraft is seen with a prospective life in excess of 40 years, 
the project includes a commitment to update and improve its systems periodically.  
Thus far, JSF has exceeded expectations, and the Italians are pleased with their role 
in development work.  They like the arrangements for all partners working together 
to decide, periodically, what the next block of the aircraft will resemble. 
The JSF competitors are the Typhoon and the Gripen.  Italy sees the 
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out-of-theatre, air-to-ground capability which future coalition warfare will require.  
Our respondent entered a caveat, however, that other goals also need decision-
makers’ consideration.  He cautioned that purely military considerations are not 
enough.  There are also matters of jobs as well as political independence requiring 
freedom in use if the Italians buy the product.   
An alliance is a matter of choice, and the EU is also seeking an important 
strategic role.  While shared values and cooperation are important, Italy wishes its 
own industry to be independent.  The respondent conceded that balancing these 
goals was not easy.  He also interjected that technology often moves in two 
directions, and that Italy has transferred European technology to the US. 
Our respondent indicated that, so far, Italy was satisfied with the JSF 
experience, but that there is much room for improvement.  Industrial participation is 
a major issue.  He described Italian industry as hungry for work and emphasized that 
it is pointless to ignore the relevant political issues: Europe vs. the US, and cost vs. 
release of technology.  Also, Italian industry is accustomed to priority going to 
partners in the offset environment.   
In response to our questions whether the major Italian holding company, 
Finmeccanica, will play the role of traffic cop guiding contracts in Italy to particular 
divisions, he observed that each company and industry makes its own decisions with 
each bidding separately for work.  However, he conceded that there was a synergy 
within the organization, and the individual pieces would typically form an alliance 
rather than compete.  He also noted a potential problem when partner companies on 
the JSF are also members of other consortia with non-JSF members.   
Under such circumstances, it may be difficult to maintain a firewall keeping 
JSF technology completely separate and confidential.  This is especially true when 
dealing with other Finmeccanica units.  Finmeccanica participates in several 
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industrial activities of its units.  It has influence with the Italian Government and the 
selection of particular weapon systems that it finds most attractive. 
The respondent noted the JSF supply chain will be different from those in 
prior projects.  He emphasized that the bulk of the business is to be found not in 
production but in maintenance over the life of the aircraft.  Thus, lifecycle costs are 
what sell the product.  The structure of the JSF organization stresses long-term 
sustainment, and there is no reason why industry can't share in this aspect of the 
project.  (A major problem with the Tornado was that it was originally built with little 
or no thought about maintainability.)  More attention has been devoted to the issue 
of logistics in the JSF project, but he felt that there is room to improve the design to 
improve sustainability.  He added the thought that there are opportunities in the JSF 
project to involve small and previously non-defense-oriented companies to the 
teams in Italy.  
The Netherlands: The Dutch defense budget dropped substantially in the 
post-1989 period, which brought a significant consolidation in the structure of the 
Dutch defense industrial base.  One result was the decline in the number of “pure” 
defense firms.  A strategy was needed to reorganize the defense-related industries.   
The first step was to build a strategic relationship that would help firms to 
better cooperate in the search for providing better value for money.  It was 
necessary to realize that defense firms operate in a negotiated rather than in a 
competitive market.  Furthermore, firms operating in the defense market could no 
longer depend on a constant stream of government defense orders.  Thus, many of 
them faced the choice of selling out or attempting to diversify.   
Those that survived made the transition to a much more competitive 
environment.  Some searched for offset credits outstanding to improve their sales 
prospects.  Others recognized the political costs of offsets such as the US ITAR 
regulations on third-country sales, which restricted where Dutch firms could sell 
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discourage firms from selling to the US DoD or cooperating with projects which 
make them subject to such regulations.  Since technology has grown very rapidly in 
the commercial sector, the development of new models for such markets appeared 
more attractive than the traditional defense market.  Our respondent saw the US-
controlled export control system as more damaging than protective of US interests. 
The JSF program appeared to represent a new philosophy for US defense 
procurement.  Contract awards supposedly will be made by the principal contractors 
on a best-value-for-money basis.  However, a steering committee of the JSF project 
will provide support on industrial matters.  Our respondent made the point that for all 
participants, the cornerstone of this program is the ability of each partner state to 
deal on a bilateral relationship with the US (on a government-to-government basis) 
on matters of industrial participation rather than to go through the Joint Program 
Office.41  
Our respondents also complained that not all partners shared equal access to 
technical data.  They were assured, however, that after a few years into the 
development stage, additional data would be released.  The point was stressed that 
the Dutch Parliament had invested a significant sum in the project as an entrance 
fee, but that no decision had yet been made on whether to actually purchase the F-
35.  It was hinted, however, that this might be a strategic game designed to keep the 
payee “on the ball.” 
With respect to potential industrial organization of a Dutch team, Stork Fokker 
AESP (as the principal aerospace firm) was likely to be involved, but many (perhaps 
50) other Dutch firms had expressed interest through their willingness to pay an 
entrance fee to join a consortium devoted to acquiring work on the JSF. 
                                            
41 This would be a way to circumvent the plans for this program and, thus, deserves attention.  To 
some extent, it supports a point made by a Lockheed Martin executive that some partners had put  
pressure on the director of the Joint Program Office to attempt to influence Lockheed Martin’s 
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Respondents noted that their historical experience with US aircraft had been 
positive, both operationally and logistically.  The Dutch are confident of their ability to 
operate such aircraft, having had experience with interoperability, joint training, etc.  
They conceded that the F-35 was the only true fifth-generation fighter in the 
competition.  Thus far, they are positively impressed by the concern shown over 
matters of logistics and sustainability in operations.   
The Dutch consider this focus on post-sales matters crucial in a program 
expected to operate over many years.  However, given the geographic scope of the 
partnership, they felt it would be very useful to consider the establishment of regional 
support centers. A final point made was the importance of The Netherlands 
Department of Economic Affairs, which was represented at the meeting and which 
works closely with the MOD on the JSF project.   
Norway: The meeting began with a side discussion of whether Norway had 
noticed significant differences in its experience on the F-16 project when Lockheed 
Martin bought the F-16 operation from General Dynamics.  Our respondents noted 
that there were few changes, as most of the staff assigned to the project remained 
unchanged.  Long-term contacts had been established over the years, and Norway 
was very satisfied, especially in matters of operations and logistics.  Indeed, the 
respondents’ experience on the midlife update was much better than expected.  
They made the interesting point that the project "forced Americans to recognize that 
Europeans can cooperate effectively.”   
Stress was placed on the point that industrial cooperation on the F-16 was a 
success and helped Norway to develop new industrial capabilities, which became 
the foundation for its present high technology industries.  They singled out Volvo 
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in 1986, Volvo stepped in and now owns 80% of the operation, with the remaining 
20% owned by Pratt & Whitney.42   
The point was made that Kongsberg had developed a Norwegian supply 
chain during the F-16 experience and would logically utilize it on JSF work.  They 
consider the JSF a major improvement in the quality of air-to-ground application of 
air power.  Its stealth qualities, while not outstanding, represent an improvement.  
Also, while it is not optimized for air-to-air combat, it is superior to the third-
generation F-16 in that area.  The important point was made, however, that 
Norway's primary goal in entering into the JSF project was industrial, not military.  
This was not seen as a uniquely Norwegian objective when it joined Denmark and 
the Netherlands in the JSF Concept Demonstration Phase with the US.   
While the JSF philosophy stresses best-value-for-money where only well-
qualified firms will win contracts, the relevant question is how this will affect the 
industries of partner states?  They also wanted to participate in the development of 
the new aircraft with its focus on logistics and cost control, but saw their participation 
as an opportunity for Norwegian industry to gain contracts.  It was seen as a risk-
reduction decision, as it would likely be a model for future international cooperation.  
Therefore, the first major dispute was over the application of the US ITAR 
rules to the project.  These nondisclosure regulations had been a problem for the 
Norwegians on the F-16 project, and these rules denied them entry into areas in 
which they wished to develop capabilities.  While they were allowed some 
technology transfers in structural matters, engine work, and electronics, these were 
not at levels of system responsibility.  The model was frustrating as their 
expectations as “partners” were much higher than what they obtained.   
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Under more traditional offset arrangements, Norwegian authorities would be 
the ones to decide where domestic industry has the capability to participate.  Norway 
wanted to strengthen its capacities in those areas in which it felt it already had much 
to offer.   
The present offers on the Gripen and Typhoon would deliver 100% offsets 
and give Norway a more prominent voice in industrial participation matters.  This 
contrasts with the JSF, in which Norway is a minor partner with much less influence 
than the UK, for example.  Offset arrangements would raise the possibility of 
Norwegian participation in other projects to which it might be able to contribute its 
competencies and strength. 
The discussion then turned to broader economic matters, which helped the 
authors to understand Norway's reservations concerning JSF arrangements.  In 
recent years, Norway has enjoyed strong economic growth that has yielded large 
budgetary surpluses.  Oil exploration and extraction have played a major role in 
these developments.  However, the country has shown concern about what will 
happen when its oil resources are exhausted. 
The Norwegian government will soon have to present to its parliament a new 
industrial strategy designed to build Norwegian competencies to meet future needs.  
Our respondents felt that environmental and resource concerns can best be dealt 
with by strengthening existing competencies and developing new ones in advanced 
technology areas.  Norway has a well-educated workforce, but its factory floor labor 
is expensive.  Norwegian authorities are interested in working on high technology 
products, which will improve the general level of their industrial capabilities and will 
make better use of their skilled engineers and managers that are relatively 
inexpensive.   
They are not attracted by the opportunity to increase factory jobs with 
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improve Norway’s ability to win contracts.  The fact is that labor-intensive work is not 
an area of comparative advantage.   
Another consideration is found in the respondents’ belief that Norway is quite 
competitive in areas in which its industry has developed products.  This should not 
be surprising since Norwegian firms design according to Norwegian comparative 
advantages in production.  An example was given of the firm Nammo Raufoss AS, 
which produces ammunition.  There are many producers of ammunition throughout 
the world, but Nammo Raufoss has attained success on the basis of its excellent 
design, which has provided a cost advantage over its competitors.   
Some years ago, a Nammo Raufoss executive was not hesitant to attribute 
much of the firm’s success to its participation in the F-16 program.  His comments at 
an international conference follow:  
I will limit myself to speak about technology transfer […] What were our 
experiences?  Well, our objective was to help technology transfer to support 
our existing production of defense material, which is ammunition, and to have 
some new technology for our civilian production.  We have gained system 
management, which I think is important.  We have some jobs in NC 
(numerically-controlled) machines which we did not have before.  We have 
learned about forging high strength aluminum, which is important to us for our 
civilian production.  We have learned about non-destructive testing, more 
than we knew before, and we have learned about the U.S. Air Force quality 
control system, which we also think is important.  And, not least, we have 
gained close cooperation with new firms in the United States. 
I will add that in the beginning it was rather difficult to have our U.S. partners 
understand our objectives.  So we had to use rather heavy persuasion to 
have them accept our wishes for technology transfer.  But, after that initial 
period of some months, we must say that they have been most cooperative.  
So far the program has been a success concerning transfer of technology.43  
                                            
43 N. Tommeraas, “Comments”,  pp.258-259 on Bernard Udis, “Technology Transfer in the Case of 
the F-16 Military Aircraft,” in Sherman Gee, Technology Transfer in Industrialized  Countries, Alphen 
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Due to its high general labor costs, Norway doesn’t produce shirts, shoes, 
ties, and other goods with which they would have to compete with China, for 
example.  When other design processes are more labor intensive, Norway is not 
competitive.  Thus far, the industrial aspects of the JSF program are not satisfactory 
for Norway.  The respondents are disappointed that their ambition to enter the 
program at higher technical levels hasn't been realized.  They are not attracted by 
the opportunity to produce high volumes of simple objects.  The situation would be 
quite attractive if Norwegian-developed weapon systems were integrated into the 
project; indeed, this would make Norway's position more competitive.  Norwegian 
requirements for firm, binding information from the present competitors were 
transmitted in January 2008.  This information will be used to evaluate and rank the 
competitors in late 2008. 
We then turned to examine the strength of the Pan-Nordic idea, which has 
been used by Sweden to make the Gripen a more attractive alternative.  Its influence 
is rated as marginal, and more depends on the actual attractiveness of the offer 
itself—industrially and militarily.  The two countries share a similar geography and 
concern with the Baltic region.  Recently, the Swedish and Norwegian Commanders-
in-Chief jointly authored an article on the importance of combined efforts.  In general, 
cooperation with Swedish industry has been very good.   
However, there are problems associated with closer military cooperation.  For 
example, Sweden has a much larger and diverse defense sector, which reflects its 
traditional emphasis on self-reliance in defense production.  While the Swedish 
military budget has declined faster than the Norwegian (bringing the two closer in 
size), Sweden still has one of the six largest defense industries in Europe.  Thus, 
successful industrial participation could lead to a restrictive division of labor and 
industrial capabilities in which Sweden would have to sacrifice some part of its 
industrial complex.  To develop an industrial package, Sweden would have to find a 
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better to set plans for Norway to participate in the next-generation Gripen.  They 
would find this more attractive than work on the JSF, which they found not “noble.” 
Interestingly, the concept of regional support centers (which was raised in the 
Dutch interview) was raised independently by the Norwegians, who saw some logic 
in close cooperation with such states as The Netherlands, Denmark, and perhaps 
Italy. 
As an addendum, it should be noted that years ago in the offset environment, 
a major French defense firm directed its engineering staff to reexamine its 
production layout to locate areas in which potential customers could be offered offset 
work with minimum difficulty.  One wonders whether a similar method might find a 
way to integrate Norwegian design into the JSF project.  Our impression is that 
Norway is seriously considering departing the program as presently structured. 
This impression is strengthened by a recent statements by government 
officials which stress the importance of “strict offsetting requirements” in their 
ultimate contract award and the Norwegian government’s expectation that 
Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace (KDA) would receive, as it had in the past, the 
largest part of offset agreements concluded in Norway (O’Dwyer, 2007, December 
10, p. 12).  Espen Barth-Eide, Undersecretary of State at the Norwegian Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) was quoted recently as saying, “Whether fighter type is chosen, 
Norway will still demand investments, either offset or the JSF development program.  
We will look for real industrial participation, regardless of its name.” (O’Dwyer, 2008, 
Jan 14, p. 18) 
Perhaps it is merely a matter of semantics, but, high-ranking Norwegian 
government officials demonstrated little regard for two basic principles of the JSF 
program: that value for money rather than guaranteed work shares (offsets) would 
determine assigned work on the program and that the US principal contractors 
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Turkey: The discussion began with a brief review of Turkey's experience with 
its F-16 aircraft.  In general, the Turks appear to be happy with the F-16.  They have 
encountered no major problems and are satisfied with the program, particularly with 
the industrial participation aspects.  Thus far on the JSF project, however, they are 
not very happy—especially with the work assignment experience.  The Turks are 
now involved with Lockheed Martin in talks designed to obtain more benefits for their 
industry.  They are also considering offers from the Typhoon group that involve 
some clear opportunities for industrial participation.   
The JSF is a "more powerful aircraft" than the Typhoon and will therefore 
probably be chosen.  Our respondent noted that the JSF aircraft is a completely 
different product than the F-16 on the operational side, although the same firms 
would likely participate in both projects.  This is because Turkey lacks a large, 
developed aerospace sector.  Turkey’s most important firms are TIA on the airframe 
side, TEI in engine work, and ALP for special engine parts and components.44  There 
are, perhaps, three firms involved with software.   
In contrast to partner states with a more advanced industrial sector, the Turks 
don't expect non-defense firms to find a significant place in the supply chain for the 
production of an advanced aircraft like the F-35.  Our respondent emphasized 
Turkey's lack of experience in aviation work and was reluctant to speculate about its 
future role in the JSF project. 
United Kingdom: Our UK respondent began the meeting by emphasizing the 
importance to Britain of the STOVL variant, noting that the UK’s very large 
investment in aircraft carriers depends heavily on its successful development.  He 
noted as well that the Royal Air Force is quite interested in STOVL aircraft which 
could be launched from shipboard.  The respondent appeared proud of the rather 
                                            
44 In an earlier meeting with Lockheed Martin executives, TIA was described as "a real success 
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widespread use of Harrier-type aircraft in the US Marine Corps, and the Spanish and 
Italian navies, in addition to their utilization in the British Royal Navy and Royal Air 
Force. 
He emphasized that rapid changes in the strategic landscape had made 
extended delay between design and delivery of weapon systems intolerable and 
gave the Typhoon as an example.  Today, the speed of change in technology has 
led to technological compression, which makes equipment obsolete before it is 
delivered to the services.  Yet, the British MOD must have some idea of what future 
technology will look like.  The military is no longer pushing the market to meet its 
technology needs; rather, it is struggling to keep up with rapid market innovations 
developed for the commercial sector.   
The UK is the only Level I partner in the JSF project and has made a 
substantial investment, which it hopes will bring an adequate return.  Much is riding 
on the success of the project for Britain.  Nevertheless, no commitment to buy will be 
forthcoming unless the support strategy is clearly determined.  Our respondent 
seemed to believe that the Joint Program Office has excellent people working to 
solve some of the major problems encountered thus far.   
The notion that each nation's industry must compete to win contracts 
appealed to him, especially when compared with the Typhoon experience—in which 
the assigned work share was “calculated to several decimal places” with grossly 
inefficient results.  Nevertheless, some lessons were learned which allowed some 
improvements in the Typhoon over the earlier Tornado.  Some of these were 
administrative in nature.  Spain, the new partner in the Typhoon program, learned 
some lessons from watching Italy’s experience with that aircraft.  The most important 
was that it was tough to be a minority stockholder.  Determined not to be the “new 
little boy on the block,” Spain began to exert its influence early in the project.  The 
unanimous decision rule was adopted for some decision-making in the Typhoon 
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Our respondent noted that unanimous decision rules were difficult and 
observed that in the EU, a form of qualified majority voting was now in effect.  The 
source of funds from Spain in this project came from the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, not the MOD, so the interest in work share and jobs was unmistakable.  By 
contrast, decision rules were firmly established in the JSF project from the 
beginning.  Our respondent observed, “Since the US was providing approximately 
90% of the investment in this project, its desires were driving the program.”  Still, no 
nation has yet committed to purchase the aircraft and is not likely to do so unless it 
first is satisfied with such factors as cost, delivery date, capabilities, etc. 
The conversation then switched to the question of operational sovereignty.  
Our respondent expressed the opinion that US laws dealing with export control were 
more complex than necessary to accomplish their objectives.  He expressed the 
belief that they were unnecessarily detailed on items like components and are 
applied to commercial items as well as military.  His statistics showed that in the 
year 2006, license applications were submitted for 8500 items worth something like 
$14 billion in UK-US transactions, and that 99.8% were approved.  It is well known 
that the UK is not a threat to the US.   
He conceded that on occasion, in the past, mistakes were made; in his 
opinion, both sides were to blame.  He expressed the firm belief that for export 
success to be attained, technology sharing is essential.  He felt that complications 
resulting from such rules have caused delays in getting essential items into the 
hands of the warfighters.  At the time of our meeting, however, he appeared 
optimistic about resolving such problems.  In his judgment, it is essential for each 
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problems have been solved, although he cautioned that changes won't occur 
immediately and that it will take some time for the details to be worked out.45  
Our respondent's optimism was, in part, a reflection of his confidence in the 
top British negotiator, Lord Drayson—the MOD's procurement chief.  He noted that 
Drayson was very experienced in commerce and industry, having developed his own 
very successful pharmaceutical firm.  The respondent felt Drayson had "brought 
clarity of thinking to the MOD on procurement matters, with, among other things, his 
understanding of Intellectual property rights issues."  If this very favorable view of 
Lord Drayson's talents and his importance to these delicate negotiations is correct, a 
new degree of uncertainty may have been introduced by his abrupt resignation from 
his MOD post on November 7, 2007 (Chuter, 2007, November 12, p. 1).    
Our respondent was firm in his belief that the UK does not want to experience 
the problems encountered by the F-16 partners when they desired  to change the 
capabilities of the platform, and, in particular, to introduce different weapon systems.  
In his view, operational sovereignty requires that the partners know how things work 
on their aircraft to permit them to handle issues of maintenance and modification 
without awaiting the arrival of an American engineer to guide them through the job.  
For the UK to continue to participate in the JSF program, it requires a government-
to-government agreement that provides such conditions.  A bilateral document was 
signed in December 2004, but his government felt the need for additional 
assurances, which he apparently believes were obtained in a joint document agreed 
to by then-Prime Minister Blair and President Bush in late 2006.46   
The three major partners on the airframe are Lockheed Martin, Northrop 
Grumman, and BAE Systems.  But from our respondent’s perspective, even BAE 
                                            
45 This caution was seconded by some Lockheed Martin executives who expressed the opinion that 
certain crucial technologies involving weapon systems and electronic warfare devices would "never" 
be transferred abroad and that such matters would have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.   
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must win participation rights based on efficiency criteria.  This has potential supply-
chain implications as it suggests that periodically, bids may be received from 
interested parties "throughout the world."  
This is a new business model in a world which operates largely on offset 
rules.  It requires the UK to be thoughtful about some market decisions.  The UK is 
known as a good place to do business, and firms such as General Dynamics, 
Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman are familiar with British capabilities.  It 
does not have "national champions" which need to be protected.47   
The respondent expressed a negative opinion of offsets in defense trade and 
viewed them as a cause of higher prices as they "allowed firms to become 
dysfunctional."  He saw defense firms as no longer operating in a conventional 
market in which hardware and platforms dominated.  Rather, he saw a current focus 
on networks.  There were other significant changes in UK industry noted.  For 
example, trade protectionism is declining—except, perhaps, in warship production.  
Even here, a recent order for roll-on, roll-off ships went to Germany.  There are two 
aircraft carriers on order now, but their expected lives are fifty years; thus, the future 
market for major naval vessels is very thin.  Of the top ten direct suppliers to the 
British MOD in 2004/2005, almost half were headquartered abroad, and four were 
not traditional defense contractors.   
The administrative costs ("baggage") associated with producing for the 
defense sector are now significant, and small- to medium-sized firms with advanced 
technological capabilities have other market opportunities which appear more 
attractive.  To counter such problems, the MOD has attempted to establish 
partnering arrangements with the civil sector.  For example, the Royal Air Force 
(RAF) is generally able to conduct normal peacetime operations with seven or eight 
aerial refueling tankers, but maintains several times that number to cover emergency 
                                            
47 This may be true today, but for years, Rolls-Royce certainly appeared to be considered as a 
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possibilities.  They lease the surplus numbers for civilian use but retain the right to 
recall them when necessary for military purposes.  Pilot training that has long been 
undertaken by the military is now experiencing surplus capacity; it is now being used 
to train pilots for the military forces of friendly nations as well as for commercial 
airlines.  Such alliances are viewed as a way to share risks and benefits. 
Another point of uncertainty concerns the role of Lockheed Martin in the area 
of maintenance and sustainment of JSF aircraft.  The UK has not yet accepted 
Lockheed Martin's proposals in this area, and the task is substantial.  Support must 
be provided for the needs of multiple air forces.  This will involve meeting the 
different needs of different nations.  There also is talk of updating and improving on 
a biennial basis; the respondent feared such changes would interfere with the 
stability of operations. 
An issue which arose several times during the meeting dealt with the British 
desire to exert influence on the direction of the project consistent with the size of its 
investment.  There also were repeated negative references to the F-16 process, 
which the respondent took to mean that the "partners" were presented with a fait 
accompli when it came to design of the aircraft.  On the other hand, he indicated that 
the British contributions have been welcomed thus far in the JSF program. 
The British are attracted to the guiding principle of best-value-for-money and 
are willing to play by the rules.  If a British firm wins a contract, UK authorities will, of 
course, be pleased.  However, if a superior offer comes from another partner, they 
will certainly be willing to go along with the decision.  They recognize that the aircraft 
will not be affordable unless work is performed in the best possible industrial 
framework.  They expect a club of FMS customers to develop in the future and 
consider the product as too expensive for the US to produce by itself.  We took this 
to mean that the British see quite a market developing in the future for third-country 
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3. Understanding the Joint Strike Fighter Project 
A Post-offset Future?  The Joint Strike Fighter program appears structured to 
operate in an offsets-free mode.  An international consortium of (unequal) partners is 
responsible for developing the F-35.  Selection for production work is completed 
mostly on the basis of best value (efficiency).  Is this a model for a post-offset 
future? 
In a real sense, the current discussion echoes some old issues.  The major 
objection to offsets is their trade-distorting properties, i.e., their inefficiency.  One 
defense of offsets is their ability to reconcile a number of groups with differing 
objectives—a sort of equity case.  The JSF concept strongly emphasizes efficiency.  
The Partners’ reactions are interesting.  It appears that there’s a strong consensus in 
favor of applying efficiency criteria to other partners (free, efficient trade) while 
understanding the need for themselves to be treated equitably (fair trade?). 
Transaction Cost Economics: Delaying the Fundamental Transformation.  
International trade in defense goods frequently involves a special class of 
outsourcing relationships.  That is, portions of the product in question are outsourced 
to firms within the customer’s national boundaries.  These purchases can take a 
variety of forms—from participation in the product’s supply chain to licensed 
production of finished systems.   
From the exporting firm’s perspective, a variation of TCE’s fundamental 
transformation has occurred in this case.  Instead of a standard commercial 
purchase, a firm-to-firm relationship has come into existence.  After the terms of the 
sale are negotiated, the supplier is bound to a firm tied to his customer.  There is 
accordingly scope for opportunistic behavior: in this case failure to produce 
efficiently.   
In this context, the aim of the JSF project organization is intended to keep a 
competitive market in place as long as possible, since participation in JSF 
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delay the fundamental transformation from competitive market to long-term 
contractual relationship has yet to be determined. 
Corporate Strategy: The JSF project’s organizational scheme fits well with the 
prime contractor’s strategic aims.  From a Five-Force perspective, any defense 
industrial firm must be concerned about buyers’ power—the buyers being sovereign 
states.  The JSF mitigates this threat to profits by changing customers into risk-
sharing partners in a very real sense.  The aim is for the main customers to become 
stakeholders (albeit minor) in the overall venture to better align incentives. 
B. Emergence of the UK Defence Industrial Strategy 
Increasingly, US major defense acquisition programs involve some degree of 
participation by foreign firms.  Major US defense programs in early stages of 
development, such as the Joint Strike Fighter discussed above or the proposed KC-
30 tanker, include major participation by European firms. 
The trend toward foreign acquisitions is not new; the US Army acquired the 
de Havilland Canada C-7 Caribou transport aircraft in the 1960s, and the Marine 
Corps acquired the British Aerospace-designed (McDonnell Douglas-built) AV-8B 
Harrier II combat jet, with Rolls-Royce engines, in 1985.  However, the increasing 
complexity of modern weapon systems—including the sophistication and integration 
challenges related to software, hardware and mission platforms—has raised major 
issues and legal challenges in the implementation of transnational partnerships in 
which the US is involved.  At the heart of many of the transatlantic conflicts are 
“profound differences in strategic outlook between the United States and Europe” 
(James, 2006). Yet, it is important to understand how the defense acquisition and 
industrial relationship can best be managed. 
1. Globalization and the Defense Industry 
International trade in military products has featured a variety of objectives for 
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contractual requirements for offsets.  However, there seem to be a number of 
changes to traditional modes of behavior—with the emphasis on “industrial 
participation” moving to the fore.  The goal of industrial participation can certainly 
include offsets, but achieving it may well entail changes in strategy and behavior.  
More emphasis is placed on specific technology access and industrial partnerships 
(which represent a long view of national capabilities), and less on general economic 
benefits (such as those provided by offsets), which may prove to be short-lived.   
Industrial participation may also constitute a more sophisticated approach to 
the international defense marketplace.  The buying country’s level of expertise, its 
strategic policy, its size, and geographic location should influence goals for its 
defense aerospace industry.  Rather than short-term benefits (such as assembling 
the aircraft in the buying country), the same nation can promote the development of 
expertise in a specific set of technologies (such as radars or landing gear).  
Markowski and Hall (2006) effectively summarize the challenge: 
However, subsidized investments in defence-related industry capabilities are 
unlikely to provide a good return on taxpayers’ capital.  As we argued earlier, 
small countries such as Australia can ill afford to pay import-substitution 
premia when they offer poor prospects of sustained future work and little 
scope for inter-sector technology spillovers. (p. 61) 
As an illustration of emerging trends, the US is heavily dependent on the UK 
as the only “Tier 1” partner in the JSF program.  As of March 2006, the UK had 
invested over $2B in the JSF (US General Accountability Office, 2006; 
Congressional Research Service, 2007).  Yet the US continued to refuse to provide 
access to certain critical technologies necessary to operate, maintain, and upgrade 
the aircraft, and intense discussions were needed between the two governments to 
resolve the issue (Chao & Niblett, 2006).  Finally, after years of negotiations, the 
issue was resolved by creating a “perimeter” around the two countries’ governments 
and defense industries (Bruno, 2007).  As the largest export customer for the JSF, 
the UK can play a major role in reducing program costs through larger production 
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The Netherlands are also contributing to the JSF as lower-level EU participants, with 
smaller financial commitments. 
With the US defense market becoming potentially more contestable, we have 
seen strategic alliances forming between foreign and US defense industrial firms for 
the purpose of securing US business.  A good example is the EADS-Northrop 
Grumman team offering the KC-30 aerial tanker.  It is entirely possible that 
marketing defense products to the US involves different strategies than, say, US 
firms in selling to European nations.  A more “political” model of rent-seeking 
behavior might be more useful. 
2. The Issue of Appropriate Sovereignty 
The UK government is well aware of the conflict between the US’s concern 
about technology protection and the perhaps too-common perception that all foreign 
countries are perceived sources of security leaks and terrorism.  The Defence 
Industrial Strategy or DIS (UK Ministry of Defence, 2005) is emphatic about the 
requirement for the UK to remain interoperable with allied forces, particularly the US.  
It is equally clear about the need to preserve national autonomy in operating, 
maintaining, and upgrading weapon systems.  For example, the DIS chapter dealing 
with systems engineering includes the following section: 
Operational independence and being an intelligent customer: Systems 
engineering capability is central to understanding whether the system will 
operate as you want it to, when delivered, and as it evolves through life; it 
may not always be possible to tell this simply by independent testing. This 
applies both for initial purchase and for support and upgrades. Having reliable 
access to this capability within the UK, particularly for Urgent Operational 
Requirements, is generally a high priority. 
Avoiding the “captive customer” risk: Relying on an overseas platform 
systems engineer could limit the ability to develop and upgrade equipment to 
meet unique UK requirements, unless there are credible and clear contractual 
and political guarantees. In some areas, we may be prepared to share 
sovereignty here. But in the worst case, reliance on an overseas systems 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 96 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
expensive changes in configuration, or risk the systems engineer withdrawing 
support from older variants. 
Strategic industrial influence: Without an onshore candidate platform systems 
engineer, our negotiating leverage in procuring equipment competitively in the 
global market would be markedly reduced and we could be exposed to 
overseas monopolies. And in cooperative programmes, it is important to be 
able to participate meaningfully on an equal or near-equal footing with 
international partners. 
National provision: In some areas, overseas sourcing is impossible, for legal 
or security reasons. The ability to develop such systems has to be maintained 
on shore. (UK Ministry of Defence, 2005, p. 62-63, emphases in original) 
The fact that the nation often referred to as America’s most important ally has 
chosen to adopt a guarded attitude—the 145-page DIS has only a small number of 
passing references to the US—is indicative of the fact that the UK and (one can 
reasonably assume) the other European allies have clearly taken note of the post-
9/11 US position on exports.  The DIS breaks down weapon systems and 
component into three categories: 
 strategic assurance (capabilities which are to be retained onshore as 
they provide technologies or equipment important to safeguard the 
state, e.g., nuclear deterrent); 
 defence capability (where we require particular assurance of continued 
and consistent equipment performance); and  
 strategic influence (in military, diplomatic or industrial terms), as well as 
recognising potential technology benefits attached to these which have 
wider value. But as the DIS makes clear, even where we wish an 
industrial capability to be sustained in the UK for strategic reasons, that 
does not necessarily preclude global competition in that sector for 
some projects. (UK Ministry of Defence, 2005, p. 7) 
The DIS is important for at least two reasons.  First, it catalogs and then 
categorizes the full range of weapon systems used or contemplated to be used in 
the foreseeable future by the UK.  Second, for systems that continue to be produced 
in the UK, long-term relationships with suppliers encompassing each system’s full 
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3. State Intervention or Status Quo? 
While the initial reaction to this policy making might lead the reader of the DIS 
to say that the UK is beginning to look more like France with its firm dirigisme (rigid 
national industrial policy), some context is called for.  While the UK defense budget 
is the largest in Europe, it remains tiny compared to that of the US.  Second, even 
the US does not practice competition in a number of areas.  For example, aircraft 
carriers are only built at Northrop Grumman’s Newport News shipyard in Virginia.  
Seen from the British perspective, a smaller budget and a wide range of defense 
responsibilities lead to market failure because neither the domestic market nor 
potential exports are sufficient to maintain enough producers to compete.  And the 
US now has only Boeing and Lockheed Martin capable of building fighter or attack 
aircraft.   
Boeing is building only a small number of the EA-18G Growler electronic 
warfare aircraft (a variant of the F/A-18F) as well as a few F/A-18 E/Fs for the export 
market, with no future fighter or attack aircraft orders from DoD on the horizon.  
Lockheed Martin, currently completing its order of the F-22 Raptor and also as the 
prime contractor for the JSF, will soon be now the only domestic prime contractor for 
fixed-wing fighter aircraft. 
Second, the DIS appears to confirm (if not guarantee) the status quo in many 
sectors of the UK defence industry.  In that vein, the Ministry of Defence signed a 
“Foundation Contract” on March 1, 2007, with its largest supplier, BAE Systems.  
Subsequent work by both parties was expected to lead to a “full and legally” binding 
contract (Long Term Partnering Agreement) in the near future (UK House of 
Commons Defence Committee, 2007c).  Not mentioned in the DIS specifically, but 
definitely in the background is the already significant cross-investment in defense 
industries between the two countries: 
Furthermore, over the last decade, the U.S. and UK defense industries have 
established a significant physical presence in each others’ country. This has 
reflected the political imperative of needing to be able to compete “on shore” 
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contractors have established or acquired operations in the UK, including 
Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman. 
There have also been significant acquisitions in the UK by second tier US 
aerospace/defense firms. In total U.S. companies have bought 27 UK 
aerospace/defense firms worth $5.1 billion over the last five years, 
representing a little over half of all the U.S. investment in foreign defense 
assets. Meanwhile U.K. companies have acquired 50 aerospace/defense 
firms in the United States worth $7.3 billion since 2001, equaling three-
quarters of all foreign investment in the U.S. defense sector. And there have 
continued to be significant acquisitions by the second tier back and forth 
across the two countries. (Chao & Niblett, 2006, pp. 20-21). 
Emphasis on stability and long-term relationships is the dominant feature of 
the DIS.  For example, small helicopters (currently made in the UK) are considered 
an essential onshore capability, while large helicopters (such as the Boeing CH-47 
Chinook) are not.  Bombers and transports (which have not been produced in the 
UK for some time) are viewed as easily available offshore.  Lewis Page (2006), a 
well-known British critic of UK acquisition policy, has argued the following in a 
somewhat flippant manner: 
Once one has lifted up one’s head from the disorienting fantasy world of the 
DIS and smelled the coffee, one does notice a curious coincidence. The 
government’s top brains, after months of careful pondering, have—and this 
can only be a remarkable coincidence—determined that the precise 
capabilities which are key to an appropriate British sovereignty just happen to 
be the very ones which are present onshore at the moment. How amazingly 
fortunate! Nobody will have to be fired; nothing nasty will happen to any 
British civilians; no minister need exhibit any backbone. There might even be 
some money left over to buy the real stuff from the Yanks, albeit not very 
much of it. (p. 1) 
The DIS is indeed easy to criticize as a lengthy exercise in cataloging and 
justifying the status quo; yet it also represents a clear prioritization of defense 
spending that is necessary to all nations. 
5. The A400M: Onshore or Offshore? 
The exclusion of airlifters from onshore manufacturing, as stated previously, 
looks obvious.  Britain has not built such aircraft in many years and obtains its cargo 
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participant and buyer of the Airbus A400M transport and the DIS exclusion of this 
type of system from onshore production may confirm the wisdom of avoiding the 
creation of a UK industrial base for large aircraft. 
The A400M can best be described as a hybrid in size and function of the C-
130J and the C-17.  It is interesting that since the RAF has bought both of these US 
products, it is also committed to buying a number of the A400M—although private 
discussions have revealed that the UK no longer needs this European airlifter and is 
trying to reduce or eliminate its commitment for 25 of the type, down from the 
original 45 agreed to with partner nations in 1982.  The lack of UK requirements 
stems mostly from the fact that the RAF has acquired five C-17s and 25 C-130Js.   
If the A400M were added to this mix, the UK would find itself with what has 
been described as “an incredibly complicated airlift fleet” (Aboulafia, 2003, 16).  The 
A400M was officially launched in 1982, and the Europrop International (EPI) TP400-
D6 engine was selected in 2003.  Delivery of the first test engine, originally 
scheduled for the fall of 2007, will now be at least a year behind schedule (Aboulafia, 
2003; Barrie & Wall, 2007).   
Given the drawn-out production schedule and engine problems (particularly 
for a transport aircraft), and the eventual cost to the European nations that actually 
buy the aircraft (should it reach production), the wisdom of leaving the field to the US 
makes eminent sense from the UK’s perspective.  Yet the UK is trying to determine 
what is possible and practical.   
However, for countries such as France and Germany, having a European 
airlift manufacturing capability trumps other considerations. And with BAE Systems 
having sold its share in Airbus, there is no longer any British corporate investment in 
the A400M, although many UK suppliers continue to be involved.  Indeed, Marshall 
Aerospace of Cambridge is scheduled to test the A400M engine once it is ready.  
Currently, nine nations have orders for a total of 192 of the A400M, down from 297 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 100 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
syndrome of multiple and lengthy production delays is common for combat aircraft, 
but is somewhat surprising for a cargo aircraft. Furthermore, A400M production 
problems may have clouded the need to adequately plan total lifecycle support, a 
cornerstone of the DIS.  The following excerpt from a parliamentary report is telling: 
91. In its memorandum Marshall Aerospace stated that the A400M would 
provide a significant boost to the MoD’s air-lift capacity, but raised concerns 
about the MoD’s approach to supporting the aircraft as it could see “no 
evidence that the MoD is taking due account of the sovereignty issues for 
A400M, as specified in the DIS.”  We asked the MoD about the arrangements 
for supporting and maintaining the A400 aircraft when it enters service.  The 
development and production contract with Airbus includes some support 
provision, but was not “a full support solution of a modern kind.”  Mr Rowntree 
said that further work was being undertaken to consider what the support 
solution might look like which included looking at “possible collaborative and 
UK national options.” 
92. We sought confirmation that the support arrangement would provide the 
UK with sovereign national capability.  Mr Rowntree said that the design 
authority for the aircraft was not “at the moment UK-based” and this required 
the MoD to make sure that there were arrangements with an “onshore expert 
provider….and we are working, along with a number of suppliers, to make 
sure that we make those right decisions to keep the capability we need.”  He 
considered that there were certain elements of the support arrangement that 
“sensibly should be pan-European.”  The MOD is undertaking work to 
identify a support and maintenance arrangement for the A400M aircraft 
when it enters service. 
The MOD needs to ensure that the arrangement identified provides the 
UK with operational sovereignty. (UK House of Commons Defence 
Committee, 2007c, emphasis in original) 
The ongoing A400M saga provides some insight into the UK’s perspective 
with respect to the defense spending priorities of its European neighbors.  In the first 
nine months of 2007 alone, EADS lost €705 million on all its activities, including the 
A400M and the A380 superjumbo airliner (El País, 2007b). The DIS appears to be 
an attempt to combine long-term realism in terms of technology capabilities and 
spending constraints with recognition that sourcing offshore, whether from the US, 
Europe, or elsewhere, is in the UK’s best interests.  We will discuss the challenge of 
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An illuminating example along these lines comes from Spain, which has 
developed a small and tightly focused defense aerospace industry.  A good example 
is CASA Aerospace, the Spanish division of EADS that has developed the CN-235 
family of twin-engine aircraft, which remains in production.  Over 250 of these 
turboprops have been sold to the armed forces of 23 countries, including the US 
Coast Guard, which is acquiring between 20 and 36 of the aircraft for patrol and 
search and rescue as the HC-144A.  However, the first customer for the aircraft was 
the Spanish Air Force, which had a clear requirement and ordered 20 between 1988 
and 1990, which served as a basis for export sales (Jane’s, 2007). 
Spanish defense acquisition policy is based on one overriding principle.  The 
needs of the nation’s armed forces determine industrial policy (Ministerio de la 
Defensa, 2007).  Spain does not fund the development of technologies or 
manufacture of weapon systems intended for other countries -- after having been 
through several iterations of defense industrial policy beginning with the offset-based 
acquisition of the F-18 A/B in the early 1980s.  Spain’s domestically grounded policy, 
which is based on a 15-year acquisition plan (Ministerio de la Defensa, 2007) has 
been described as follows: 
International mergers and acquisitions can provide a more structural link to 
foreign partners and integrate the domestic industries within international 
production networks.  Yet, if the defence authorities wish to retain and 
improve specific technological capabilities, they may be compelled to provide 
a stream of domestic projects to sustain specific capabilities that may already 
exist in other countries.  The involvement of foreign partners in Spanish 
defence production is directly supported by the domestic market. (Molas-
Gallart, 2006; pp. 103-104) 
Both Spain and the UK have recently developed defense aerospace 
acquisition policies that are portrayed by their governments as: based on military 
requirements, affordable, and meant to provide long-term stability to domestic 
industry.  Yet the size of the UK’s military, by far the largest in Europe, and its 
shared interests with the US continue to drive unique decisions, which we will 
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6. The UK-US Special Relationship Continues 
While crafting its own roadmap to “appropriate sovereignty,” the UK wants to 
retain the “special relationship” with the US it has enjoyed since World War II, while 
continuing to cooperate with other EU nations to produce a wide variety of weapon 
systems.  Maintaining US-UK trust has proven a challenge since 11 September 
2001.  The Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy has the stated 
goal of “maintaining technological superiority over all potential adversaries as a 
central national priority” (Chao & Niblett, 2006, p. 24).  Despite what can only be 
described as the most loyal and intense cooperation possible with the US, the UK, 
post 9/11, perceives itself a victim of an emergent xenophobia in certain 
Administration circles; no country can be trusted, whatever the situation and the 
historic ties.   
This behavior has led to deep skepticism within the UK about the true 
willingness of the US to “partner” on the JSF and share the technology that will 
permit the “appropriate sovereignty” envisaged by the DIS.  The following exchange 
in the UK House of Commons Defence Committee between Member of Parliament 
Bernard Jenkin, Committee Chairman James Arbuthnot, and Lord Drayson, then 
Minister of Defence Procurement, is an interesting indicator of the current climate in 
Britain: 
Q104 Mr Jenkin: Can I just ask a short supplementary on technology. In the 
discussions with the United States about technology sharing, do people over 
there express anxiety about us sharing technology with our European 
partners and, therefore, the United Kingdom is potentially a leak into Europe? 
Lord Drayson: Yes, they have expressed that concern. 
Q105 Mr Jenkin: What do you have to say in order to reassure them? 
Lord Drayson: “No, we do not.” 
Q106 Chairman: That is very satisfactory. 
Lord Drayson: It is very important the United Kingdom respects technology 
transfer agreements and keeps secrets secret. 
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Lord Drayson: We have signed the MoU [Memorandum of Understanding], 
Chairman. (UK House of Commons, 2007a) 
In an earlier appearance before the US Senate Armed Services Committee 
(SASC), Lord Drayson essentially stated that British participation in the JSF comes 
at a price for the US.  While the UK has invested over $2B in this system and is the 
only “Tier I” partner, the US had arguably not been forthcoming with respect to 
acquisition of software code needed to maintain and upgrade the JSF.  This conduct 
strikes directly at the “operational sovereignty” that is at the heart of the UK Defence 
Industrial Strategy.  Using typical British understatement combined with 
commendable clarity, Lord Drayson outlined how the US could not take even its 
most important ally for granted.  The lengthy excerpt is worth reproducing for its 
insights into British policy: 
Our aim is to ensure that future generations of UK and US servicemen and 
women can continue to stand shoulder to shoulder in pursuit of common 
goals. Increasingly we recognise that this will depend upon access to 
common technology. With its increasing complexity, and the growing 
importance of expeditionary fighting power, the necessity to share information 
and technology between our two great nations both in relation to JSF and 
more generally is ever more vital. 
Whilst I appreciate the concerns of some in the US about the issue of 
Technology Transfer, the British public expect their Government to equip our 
Armed Forces with the very best and I am determined to best represent the 
interests of our national security and our British Service personnel. 
The next key milestone in the programme, the signing of the Production, 
Containment and Follow-On Development MOU [memorandum of 
understanding] will commit the United Kingdom to the whole life of the JSF 
program. We must therefore be sure to understand the nature and balance of 
the obligations between our nations consistent with the principles of the 
agreements on JSF we have signed to date. Operational sovereignty, the 
ability to integrate, upgrade, operate and sustain the aircraft as we see fit and 
without recourse to others is of paramount importance. 
Let me state our bottom line. These issues are important to us because they 
enable us to make the judgement that the aircraft are "fit to fight" and we can 
send our airmen and women into action in that knowledge. This decision has 
to be one for the UK, indeed the British Government's responsibility to our 
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made by the UK. If we do not have the information and technology needed to 
make that decision, then I shall not be able to sign the MOU. I recognise the 
consequences that would have on the UK's continuing participation in the 
programme. (UK Ministry of Defence, 2006, emphasis added) 
Jones and Larabee (2005; 2006) have pointed out that streamlining of US 
export controls is critical to the development of defense collaboration between US 
and EU nations, as well as multinational cooperative programs such as the JSF. 
This view has been echoed specifically with respect to the US-UK relationship by 
Chao and Niblett (2006).  Versailles and Mérindol (2006) emphasize the importance 
for all parties in the US-EU debate to see the “big picture” of international 
cooperation when engaging in science and technology-related decision-making, 
including an understanding of knowledge transfers and networking.  Hopefully, both 
the US and the UK will rise to the occasion and preserve the “special relationship” 
which is implicitly central to the viability of the Defence Industrial Strategy, now that 
the MoU has been signed (Bruno, 2007). 
7. Understanding the UK Defence Industrial Strategy 
Offsets Relabeled?  Taken at face value, the Defence Industrial Strategy 
(DIS) is intended for a post-offsets regime in defense trade.  This may reflect the 
UK’s position as a defense exporter.  However, the document is careful to identify 
areas (core industries) in which there must be UK participation in supplying defense 
goods.  Among other things, this provides for a basis for future negotiations over 
offsets through industrial participation.  While the “offsets” label will likely not appear 
in future military sales agreements, those who sell to the British MOD will 
undoubtedly have to tie their proposals to furthering the purposes stated in the DIS. 
Transaction Cost Economics: One of the major purposes of the DIS is 
protection from risks and costs associated with outsourcing major portions of 
defense equipment.  A Transaction Cost Economics assessment of Britain’s defense 
imports (outsourcing) environment appears in Table 5 below.  We use Powell’s 
(2002) stoplight scheme to assess the potential for opportunistic behavior on the part 
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Asset Specificity Red System and system-of-system 
peculiarities 








Red Continuing need for upgrades 




Red Obviously high for major 
weapon systems 
Table 5.  Transaction Cost Economics View of UK Defense Imports 
(Based on scheme presented in Powell, 2002 and Franck, 2004) 
In short, the UK has wide-ranging international interests, and is a military 
power that consistently hits well above its weight.  Also, the UK has no realistic 
prospects of supporting its defense establishment with a “buy British” approach.  
Given those considerations, Table 5 reveals a very serious problem for the British 
defense establishment.   
Therefore, the UK’s DIS is well understood as an approach to solving that 
problem.  The DIS is a serious effort along three major axes.  First, the Strategy 
makes a serious effort to define what should, and should not, be imported.  Second, 
“appropriate sovereignty,” if attained, greatly mitigates opportunities for suppliers’ 
opportunistic behavior throughout (long) operational services.  Third, “operational 
sovereignty” is directed toward eliminating a holdup—the threat of withholding 
support for British military equipment while engaged in combat operations. 
Corporate Strategy: Shaping the Five Forces. The contemporary defense 
marketplace poses significant threats to the profitability of the British defense 
industrial base.  The DIS reserves certain categories of defense goods and services 
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modify domestically) and expertise (e.g., in systems engineering).  That is, the DIS 
seeks to protect British defense suppliers from the threat to profits (and viability) 
posed by rival defense suppliers.   
Insistence on the ability to upgrade and modify systems over the lifespan of 
the system directly addresses the threat of supplier power—directly for the MOD, 
indirectly for British firms.  Also, the rather coy approach to the US special 
relationship is a way of increasing the power of British firms (e.g., BAE) relative to 
the US DoD—an effort to translate the UK government’s political power to market 
power for British defense firms. 
C. The KC-30 Proposal 
In all likelihood, EADS entered the new century with a mixed assessment of 
future prospects.  The consortium’s Airbus series had been a clear success, with 
EADS well positioned as a leading supplier of commercial airliners.  However, the 
ability of European governments to share the risk of developing new airliners was 
coming under increasing pressure from a number of directions, including US 
initiatives to take the matter of public subsidies to the World Trade Organization.  
Moreover, the airliner business is notoriously cyclical in nature, with scant prospect 
for consistent profitability over extended periods of time.  
One logical response to the situation was to diversify the business to other 
markets.  For an aerospace firm like EADS, a logical way to do that was to be more 
involved in the defense market.  With US defense budgets declining proportionately 
less than Europe’s in the 1990s, and growing more after 11 September 2001, it was 
clear that the United States was where the money was to be had in the defense 
aerospace market.  Moreover, the US was the clear leader of an RMA leading to 
information-based, network-enabled warfare.  In short, Europe was in some danger 
of becoming a backwater of military technology, and firms confined to European 
sales were at significant risk of being permanently second-rate.  Moreover, 
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possibilities, and forego any real chance of achieving the economies of scale 
needed to compete with US defense suppliers.  Therefore, Europe-only defense 
producers were also in danger of corporate extinction.  The EU’s 1989 military sales 
sanctions that applied to China made that problem even more acute.   
While entrance into the US defense market was strongly indicated, there were 
a number of difficulties en route.  First, EADS was a foreign firm competing against 
well-established US suppliers such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin.  The American 
incumbents were strongly positioned with respect to market knowledge, military 
technology and political connections.  Second, strong Buy-American sentiment in 
Congress made competing still more difficult.48  Further, the less-than-cordial state of 
relations between the United States and France (with whose government EADS was 
strongly associated) only compounded this problem. 
At the same time, there were a number of opportunities.  One of them was the 
room for more firms in the market.  This was due less to the “natural” state of the 
market (driven by the nature of economies of scale vs. market demand).  It was due 
more to the consolidations associated with the “Last Supper” of 199349 having gone 
perhaps too far (at least in retrospect).  Thus, for example, Boeing was one obvious 
candidate to supply a replacement aerial tanker (KC-45) for the US Air Force.  The 
strongest domestic competition for Boeing for large transport aircraft was McDonnell 
Douglas, which had merged with (or had been acquired by) Boeing.  Thus, Boeing 
was the only domestic game in town.  However, Congress insisted upon 
competition, for which the only reasonable player available was EADS.   
In order to exploit the KC-30 opportunity (and others) in the US markets, 
EADS had to surmount or finesse the obstacles cited above—especially the Buy-
American sentiment.  EADS’s first approach involved an attempt toresemble a US 
                                            
48 Explicit Buy-American provisions were strongly mooted for inclusion in US Defense Authorization 
bills. 
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firm.  It built, or acquired, production facilities within US borders.  There’s good 
reason to believe that at least some of those locations were chosen with a view to 
influencing Congressional sentiment.   
EADS also hired executives with local knowledge of the US defense market, 
placed in positions directing business operations and lobbying.  Finally, EADS 
mounted a very prominent public relations campaign which touted EADS’ new North 
American identity.   
However, with US-French relations continuing to chill and the dispute over 
governmental risk sharing brewing at the WTO, EADS evidently decided it didn’t look 
enough like an American company.  The answer was to shift strategic direction and 
find a US partner, which is Northrop-Grumman (NG).  NG is not only a major 
aerospace firm but is well established in the US market—with associated local 
market knowledge and customer connections (within the US government). 
The basic goal of EADS’ campaign shifted from portraying EADS as an 
American corporation to portraying the KC-30 as an American aerial tanker.  The 
KC-30 was publicly portrayed as a Northrop-Grumman proposal.  Substantial US 
content was put into the KC-30.  The KC-30 proposal to the Air Force (as publicly 
described) involves a basic (“green”) Airbus A330 airframe assembled in Europe, 
which is then flown to the United States to be converted to an aerial tanker.  In short, 
the KC-30 involves substantial industrial participation within US borders 













Figure 3. Depiction of EADS Direct Offset Offer 
(Northrop Grumman, 2007) 
1. Understanding the KC-30 Proposal 
Stealthy Offsets.  Crafting the KC-30 proposal involved offering offsets to a 
prospective customer which had avowed its opposition to offsets (as discussed in 
Section 3B above).  Direct offsets in the KC-30 proposal, accordingly, were, by 
necessity, integral to the proposal to the Air Force, and definitely not a matter for 
subsequent negotiation.  Establishing EADS’s production capacity in the United 
States was part of the answer—offering American content (jobs) and substantial 
direct offsets (industrial participation).  In particular, EADS’ recent proposal to shift 
A330 production to the US is part of a tacit (and largely unacknowledged) process of 
bargaining over the offset package. 
Corporate Strategy: While highly successful, EADS (including its Airbus 
venture) also had major problems, particularly with its competitive position relative to 
Boeing.  Two of its major advantages were: (a) the favorable Euro/US Dollar 
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developing new products and help in other ways.  However, it seemed unlikely that 
the Euro would trade at less than one dollar indefinitely.  Also, the governmental 
arrangements were coming under increased pressure through complaints filed with 
the World Trade Organization.  Moreover, the commercial market for Airbus 
products was highly cyclical (and about to turn down).  While Boeing was subject to 
the same cyclical air transport market, it had a well-established and profitable 
defense business—primarily with the US government.  EADS, on the other hand, 
was stuck in the much less lucrative European defense market.  In short, the 
competitive correlation of forces of EADS vs. Boeing was not terribly favorable for 
the long run. 
A Five-Forces assessment of the threats to EADS profits around 2000 would 
look something like Table 6 on the following page.  In this context, the EADS 
strategy for entering the North American defense market is readily explainable using 
the corporate strategy paradigms discussed in Section 2D above.  EADS found itself 
with a fairly secure market niche in commercial air transports.  However, the 
business model of governmental risk-sharing was in some jeopardy.  Likewise, air 
transport orders were highly variable— making meaningful diversification of the 
product line an important consideration.   
FORCE THREAT TO PROFITS COMMENTS 
Internal Rivalry Moderate to High Excess capacity at low part 
of cycle; competitive 
disadvantages with respect 
to Boeing. 
Entry Low Economies of Scale.  
Substitutes & 
Complements 
Low Few substitutes for large air 
transports; many 
complements. 
Supplier Power Low Many suppliers; few buyers 
Buyer Power Varies Widely Buyers can drive hard 
bargains at low points in 
demand cycle. 
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To protect their profits, firms like EADS can take some combination of the 
three basic approaches discussed above: cost and performance advantages, a new 
market niche, and a change in the characteristics of the current environment.  Of 
these, finding a new market niche seemed most promising.  The cost advantage 
afforded by the Euro-dollar exchange rate could easily change.  Moreover, 
arrangements with EU governments came with a price—significant constraints on 
national shares of overall production.  Thus, a cost advantage over Boeing or other 
competitors would be difficult to maintain, even if it were achieved.  Since all major 
players in the defense and aerospace industries had access to the same 
technologies as EADS, there was no obvious way to offer significant performance 
advantage.  Moreover, since interoperability with US forces had become an 
important consideration in source selections, EADS would have a disadvantage 
relative to its American competitors in aerospace and defense markets (perhaps 
permanently). 
The third approach, changing the local environment, was not terribly 
promising.  EADS and Airbus already had a relatively favorable environment for 
profitability with the European Union.  The obvious way to improve that environment 
would be a large-scale EU-based emulation response to the US RMA.  The 
investments associated with such an effort would be significant, and not likely to be 
sustainable within the EU’s current political environment. 
In short, EADS proposed to protect its profitability by diversifying into the 
North American defense market.  Taken within the context of the Five Forces model, 
this can be construed as either seeking a new (less threatening) market niche, or, 
more generally, changing Porter’s Five Forces within its environment.  However, 
there were significant barriers to entry to the new market niche—a defense-sector 
analogy to brand loyalty being perhaps the most important.  An analysis of the EADS 
threat to enter the American defense market (from a Five Forces perspective) is 
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Market Characteristics EADS situation Comments 
Economies of Scale Favorable Large, established defense 
supplier. 
Reputation, brand 
loyalty, protection of 
incumbents 
Highly unfavorable Testy US-French relations; 
strong Buy-American 
sentiment. 








Highly unfavorable US firms have much better 
access to the US 
government. 
Expected retaliation Favorable EADS well-protected in 
Europe. 
Table 7.  A (Five-forces) Assessment of EADS’s Threat to Enter the US 
Defense Market, circa 2000 
A direct approach was to make EADS more of an American firm by acquiring 
assets in the United States.50  EADS intensified the campaign through its strategic 
alliance with Northrop-Grumman, thus providing an American name along with 
American content to the KC-30 proposal.  Moreover, Northrop-Grumman brought a 
number of other assets to the partnership, including its connections with the US 
Government and its experience in defense systems that must be interoperable with 
other parts of the US-defined Reconnaissance-Strike Complex (RUK). 
A well-structured KC-30 proposal also exploited an increase in firm power 
(relative to buyer’s).  In the case of the KC-30, there was only one credible US 
supplier (Boeing).  The competition imperative51 required at least one other proposal.  
EADS was thus placed in a relatively powerful position, and was thus given a 
                                            
50 The recent depreciation of the dollar relative to the Euro may accelerate this trend.  Radio France 
interview with Louis Gallois (EADS CEO), 3 December 2007, cited in DefenseNews, 10 December 
2007, p. 36. 
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significant opportunity to overcome barriers to entry to the US defense market.  In 
these terms, the KC-30 proposal is a major part of a well-crafted corporate strategy 
to protect EADS’ corporate profitability by becoming a major US defense supplier. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE): While the KC-30 proposal has 
successfully overcome or finessed a number of barriers to entry in the North 
American market, it still has problems.  Indeed, some concerns remain, and are 
readily perceived from a TCE perspective.  The EADS-Northrop Grumman team still 
needs to offer assurance about risks associated with outsourcing.   
First, aerial refueling is clearly a core competency of the US Air Force (both 
tankers and receivers).  In that context, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force assigned 
first priority to aerial tankers within the service’s acquisition programs.  Therefore, it 
might be regarded as something that shouldn’t be acquired outside national borders.  
That said, EADS’ partnership with Northrop Grumman addresses the national 
identity problem.  In that context, configuring the KC-30 for aerial refueling within US 
borders may well carry the day.  The offer to assemble A330 freighters in the US 
adds weight to the case. 
Second, and more serious, is fear of some sort of “holdup.”  In the context of 
foreign military sales, this would be the source country denying system support to 
the purchasing country—probably because of military operations encountering the 
source country’s disapproval.52  For a military capability as fundamental as aerial 
refueling, this would not be a trivial risk, and the sometimes testy state of US-French 
relations adds emphasis to this concern.  This could have been (and might well still 
be) a thorny issue for the EADS-Northrop Grumman team – perhaps in 
Congressional deliberations.
                                            
52 Denial of such support for US military operations was a major part of the case for Rep. Hunter’s 
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V. By Way of Conclusions 
As stated previously, this report was motivated by a desire to better 
understand developments taking place in defense industries focused on the United 
States and the European Community.  We have discussed the current state of the 
trans-Atlantic defense market and its many complexities.  We have also presented 
models that might be of use in understanding the nature and implications of ongoing 
developments. 
We found that our models were not as neatly separable as Graham Allison’s.  
In particular, outsourcing relationships and many offset agreements involve 
extended relationships with mutual reciprocity.  Hence, a number of relationship-
management issues that are associated with Transaction Cost Economic literature 
were also present in the execution of offset agreements, as was evident in Section 
3. 
However, we do conclude, at least tentatively, that the models presented are 
useful for understanding defense industrial developments and are largely 
complementary.  It’s reasonable to assert that all three models have significant 
explanatory power for the cases we’ve discussed. 
Our choice of cases (the JSF, the UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy, and the 
KC-30) proved to have both advantages and disadvantages as subjects for 
research.  Since all three cases are still ongoing, the facts on the ground changed 
fairly regularly.  Thus, for example, execution of the UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy 
has been called into some question due to recent reduction in the Ministry of 
Defence budget and the departure of Lord Drayson.  Regardless of these difficulties, 
we believe that the Strategy is a serious effort to resolve a number of systemic 
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Likewise, the EADS (and Northrop Grumman) offer to assemble Airbus A330 
freighters in the Alabama facility that would perform KC-30 tanker conversions was 
an interesting and thought-provoking development.   
The three models, assessed against our three cases turned out to be 
complementary rather than competing.  The various perspectives available for all 
three cases are certainly not fully consistent, but neither are they conflicting.  All 
three models have demonstrated significant explanatory power.  We conclude that 
the offsets paradigm is the most useful for explaining the course of the Joint Strike 
Fighter, although not in the standard sense.  The JSF program appears to be 
structured for the purpose of avoiding the strictures of offsets by bringing in the most 
likely customers as risk-sharing partners.  (Our interviews cast some doubt on 
whether that vision will be realized in any significant sense.)   
Similarly, the corporate strategy perspective sheds the most light on the KC-
30 case.  What seems an inescapable conclusion is that the EADS strategy for 
becoming a major player in the North American defense market was well-crafted and 
is being well-executed.  We do not contend that our three models, even taken 
together, are the only useful perspectives for the KC-30 case.  For example, it 
seems likely that part of the motivation for EADS’s A330 freighter offer is a desire to 
situate production in the realm of the (currently cheap) dollar. 
Finally, the TCE model seems best for understanding the underlying logic of 
the UK Defence Industrial Strategy.  Standard TCE analysis of imported 
(outsourced) defense systems such as the JSF indicates significant scope for 
opportunistic behavior on the part of foreign suppliers, as was demonstrated above. 
Thus, our hypothesis regarding the usefulness of multiple models to 
understand and explain the international defense marketplace is indeed supported 
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